

Date of Hearing: June 23, 2026  
Deputy Chief Counsel: Stella Choe

## ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Nick Schultz, Chair

SB 1285 (Durazo) – As Amended June 11, 2026

**SUMMARY:** Expressly states that the statute that authorizes a juvenile court judge’s discretion to dismiss a petition in the interests of justice is a general dismissal statute. **Specifically**, this bill:

- 1) States that an adjudication dismissed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 782 shall be deemed to have not occurred and a person shall not suffer any adverse consequences in the future based on the dismissed adjudication.
- 2) Provides that a dismissal of a sustained petition pursuant to this provision shall be deemed to constitute both a dismissal of the petition and a setting aside of any findings.
- 3) States the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act is to codify the holding of *In re David T.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 866 and *People v. Haro* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 718, and to disapprove the holdings in *In re Taylor C.* (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 492 and *In re Parker B.* (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 382.
- 4) States that intent of the legislature that in adding subdivision (e) in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 782 via AB 2629 (Chapter 970 of the Statutes of 2022) was to reaffirm existing law that dismissal pursuant to Section 782 and sealing of records pursuant to applicable sealings statutes are related yet distinct procedures; the Legislature did not intend to modify or reduce the relief afforded by a dismissal granted pursuant to Section 782, to change the character of that section as a general dismissal statute, or to alter established law holding that a dismissal under Section 782 removes restrictions on sealing that may be contained in the sealing statutes.
- 5) States the intent of the Legislature to reaffirm that once a juvenile court dismisses a juvenile petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 782, the petition is effectively erased as if the subject of the petition had never suffered it in the initial instance.

**EXISTING LAW:**

- 1) States that a minor between 12 and 17 years of age, inclusive, who violates any federal, state, or local law or ordinance, and a minor under 12 years of age who is alleged to have committed murder or a specified sex offenses, is within jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.)
- 2) Authorizes a juvenile court judge to dismiss a petition, or set aside the findings and dismiss the petition, if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal, or if it finds that they are not in need of treatment or rehabilitation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(1).)

- 3) Provides the court has jurisdiction to order dismissal or setting aside of the findings and dismissal regardless of whether the person who is the subject of the petition is, at the time of the order, a ward or dependent child of the court. Specifies that nothing in existing law shall be interpreted to require the court to maintain jurisdiction over a person who is the subject of a petition between the time the court's jurisdiction over that person terminates and the point at which their petition is dismissed. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(1).)
- 4) Requires the court, when exercising its discretion at the time the court terminates jurisdiction or at any time thereafter, to consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating circumstances are present, including, but not limited to, satisfactory completion of a term of probation, that rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, that dismissal of the petition would not endanger public safety, or that the underlying offense is connected to mental illness, prior victimization, or childhood trauma. Provides that proof of the presence of one or more mitigating circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(A).)
- 5) Defines "satisfactory completion of a term of probation" to mean the person has no new findings of wardship or conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during the period of supervision or probation and if the person has not failed to substantially comply with the reasonable orders of supervision or probation that are within their capacity to perform. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 782, subd. (a)(2)(B), 786, subd. (c)(1).)
- 6) Defines "rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court" to mean consistent with Section 781 which includes that the person has not been convicted of a felony or of any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(C).)
- 7) Defines "mental illness" as a mental disorder identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders excluding antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and pedophilia. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(D); Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(5).)
- 8) Provides that "childhood trauma" means that as a minor the person experienced physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, physical or emotional neglect. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(D); Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(6)(A).)
- 9) Provides that "prior victimization" means the person was a victim of intimate partner violence, sexual violence, or human trafficking, or the person has experienced psychological or physical trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(D); Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(6)(B).)
- 10) Defines "endanger public safety" to mean there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(D); Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
- 11) Provides that the great weight standard set forth in this paragraph is not applicable in cases where an individual has been convicted in criminal court of a serious or violent felony. Specifies that "serious or violent felony" means any offense defined in subdivision (c) of

Section 667.5, or in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, of the Penal Code. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(E)-(F).)

- 12) Prohibits the absence of the great weight standard under the circumstances described above from affecting the court's authority to dismiss a petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(G).)
- 13) Requires the reasons for a dismissal decision to be stated orally on the record. Requires the court to also set forth the reasons in an order entered upon the minutes if requested by either party or in any case in which the proceedings are not being recorded electronically or reported by a court reporter. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (b).)
- 14) Provides that the court has authority to exercise discretion to dismiss at any time after the filing of the petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (c).)
- 15) Provides that the court has the authority to exercise discretion to dismiss regardless of whether a petition was sustained at trial, by admission or plea agreement. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (d).)
- 16) States that dismissal of a petition, or setting aside of the findings and dismissal of a petition, after the person was declared a ward, does not alone constitute a sealing of records as defined in Section 781 or 786. Provides that any unsealed records pertaining to the dismissed petition may be accessed, inspected, or used by the court, the probation department, the prosecuting attorney, or counsel for the minor in juvenile court proceedings commenced by the filing of a new petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (e).)
- 17) Provides that dismissal of the petition, or setting aside the findings and dismissal of the petition, does not relieve a person from the obligation to pay unfulfilled victim restitution ordered pursuant to a civil judgment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (f).)

**FISCAL EFFECT:** Unknown.

**COMMENTS:**

- 1) **Sponsor:** California Youth Defender Center
- 2) **Author's Statement:** According to the author, "California's juvenile justice system is designed to rehabilitate youth and operates separately from the criminal justice system to eliminate long-term collateral consequences after termination of their court involvement. Juvenile courts have discretion to seal records and grant dismissals. Unfortunately, many people with past juvenile justice involvement encounter obstacles to fully participate in society, even after their juvenile records have been sealed.

"This is why I am proud to author SB 1285, which codifies the holding in *In re David T.* that section 782 is a general dismissal statute and that a petition dismissed under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 782 is treated as if it never happened, protecting the individual from unfair or harmful consequences in the future, in accordance with longstanding and widely accepted interpretations of California's dismissal law.

“SB 1285 safeguards justice for youth and ensures youth are treated with fairness and dignity, clarifying and reaffirming the Legislature’s spirit of the reform. We must steadfastly uphold commitment to meaningful second chances by empowering youth to begin their adult lives with a broader horizon—one that includes healing, rehabilitation, careers, and meaningful societal connections such as support networks, mentorship, and faith-based groups.”

- 3) **Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and Sealing of Records:** As a general rule, any person between the age of 12 and 17 who commits a crime falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) This extends to a youth alleged to have committed a crime before their 18th birthday, even if they were an adult at the time of arrest or commencement of proceedings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 603.) For example, if someone commits a crime at age 17, but it is not discovered or tried until the person is 20, the person can still be tried in juvenile court. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court generally continues until the youth is 21 years old, unless the youth committed a 707(b) offense, then the court may retain jurisdiction until the person attains 23 years of age. Additionally, if the youth would have, in criminal court, faced an aggregate sentence of 7 years or more, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues until the youth turns 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 607.)

The creation of the juvenile court, now over 100 years old, was rooted in the idea that adolescents, who are not fully developed or mature, are less culpable than adults. Accordingly, the focus of the juvenile court was rehabilitation, not punishment. (See, e.g., *In re Gault* (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 15-16.) The purpose of the juvenile law is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the court and to preserve and strengthen family ties when possible. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a).) Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This may include punishment that is consistent with rehabilitative objectives. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).) The juvenile court has a wide range of options available for placing its wards, including probation, placement in a relative’s home, foster home, licensed community care facility, or group home, and commitment to “a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp” or “the county juvenile hall.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 727, subd. (a); 730, subd. (a)(1).)

Because the focus of juvenile court is rehabilitation, juvenile court records generally must be destroyed when the person of record reaches the age of 38 unless good cause is shown for maintaining those records. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 826.) The person of record may also petition to destroy records retained by agencies other than the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 826, subd. (b).) The request must be granted unless good cause is shown for retention of the records. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 826.) When records are destroyed pursuant to the above provision, the proceedings “shall be deemed never to have occurred, and the person may reply accordingly to an inquiry.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 826, subd. (a).) Courts have held that the phrase “never to have occurred” means that the juvenile proceeding is deemed not to have existed. (*Parmett v. Superior Court (Christal B.)* (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1261, 1267.)

Minors adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court proceedings may petition the court to have their records sealed. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781.) To seal a juvenile court record, a petition must be filed by either the person who is the subject of the record or the probation

department. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781.) Juvenile court jurisdiction must have lapsed five years previously or the person must be at least 18 years old. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781, subd. (a).) The court must be satisfied that rehabilitation has been attained. (*Ibid.*) The records are not sealed if the person of record has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. (*Ibid.*)

In addition, there is a special sealing procedure for cases in which the person has been found by the juvenile court to have committed one of the serious or violent offenses enumerated Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707(b) list, when he or she had attained 14 years of age. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781, subd. (a)(1)(D).)

Importantly, records sealed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 781 are able to be accessed by a prosecutor if they believes that information is subject to a discovery obligation. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781 (a)(1)(D)(iii).)

In a related section of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the sealing procedure is done automatically by the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (a).) In order to qualify for automatic sealing, the person does not have to file any petition with the court. Instead, the person must simply complete the informal program of supervision, or term of probation imposed by the court. (*Ibid.*) This provision prohibits sealing of a record if the petition was sustained based on a commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, unless the finding on that offense was dismissed or reduced to a misdemeanor or to a lesser offenses not listed in subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (d).)

- 4) **Dismissals in the Interests of Justice:** Existing law gives broad discretion to juvenile judges to dismiss a petition filed in juvenile court, or set aside the findings and dismiss the petition, if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal, or if the court finds that they are not in need of treatment or rehabilitation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(1).) The court may grant dismissal regardless of whether the person who is the subject of the petition is, at the time of the order, a ward of the court. (*Ibid.*) The court may exercise this discretion at the time the court terminates jurisdiction or at any time thereafter. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(1).)

In 2022, Welfare and Institutions Code Section 782 was amended<sup>1</sup> to require the court to consider and give great weight to evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating circumstances are present, including but not limited to, satisfactory completion of a term of probation, that rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, that the dismissal would not endanger public safety, or that the underlying offense is connected to mental illness, prior victimization, or childhood trauma. The statute provides that proof of the presence of one or more mitigating circumstances weigh greatly in favor of dismissing the petition, except in cases where the individual has been convicted in criminal court of a serious or violent felony. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2).) This language is similar

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<sup>1</sup> AB 2629 (Santiago), Ch. 970, Stats. 2022.

to provisions that were added to Penal Code Section 1385, the adult dismissal statute, the previous year.<sup>2</sup>

Amendments to the section also added that dismissal of a petition, or setting aside of the findings and dismissal of a petition, pursuant to this section, after the person was declared a ward, does not alone constitute a sealing of records as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 781 or 786 and that any unsealed records pertaining to the dismissed petition may be accessed, inspected, or used by the court, the probation department, the prosecuting attorney, or counsel for the minor in juvenile court proceedings commenced by the filing of a new petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (e).) The bill also specified that a dismissal does not relieve a person from the obligation to pay unfulfilled victim restitution ordered pursuant to a civil judgement. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (f).)

Prior to the 2022 amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 782, the statute was interpreted by courts to be a general dismissal statute, meaning that a dismissal granted pursuant to that section “is intended to erase a prior adjudication – not just merely reduce or mitigate it – and to thereby protect the person from any and all future adverse consequences based on that adjudication.” (*In re David T* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 866.) In *David T.*, a former juvenile defendant filed a motion to set aside a 1995 robbery finding and dismiss the petition pursuant to Section 782, and to have his records sealed pursuant to Section 781. The court granted the former juvenile’s petition to dismiss the robbery finding on that grounds that it was in the interests of justice and welfare to do so, however denied the request to seal his juvenile records citing a prohibition against sealing records of specified crimes set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(D).<sup>3</sup> (*David T.*, *supra*, at p. 866.)

The Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s order and held that when a juvenile court sets aside findings and dismisses a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 782, the court’s action operates, as a matter of law, to erase the prior sustained petition as if the defendant had never suffered it in the initial instance. (*Id.* at p. 866.) The court distinguished a dismissal under Section 782 from other types of dismissals such as pursuant to section 786: “A dismissal under section 782 differs from the standard dismissal that occurs when the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction at the conclusion of a juvenile case. Section 782 ‘was meant to codify and expand the juvenile court’s discretionary dismissal power.’ (*David T.*, *supra*, at p. 873, citing *In re Greg F.* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 419.) The court found an earlier ruling relevant that found that Section 782 is a general dismissal statute, similar in operation to Penal Code Section 1385: “dismissal under section 1385 of the charge underlying a prior conviction operates, as a matter of law, to erase the prior conviction as if the defendant had never suffered the conviction in the initial instance.” (*David T.*, *supra*, at p. 873 citing *People v. Haro* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 718.)

In 2024, another Court of Appeal decision interpreted the 2022 amendments to Section 782 that stated that dismissal of a petition pursuant to Section 782 does not alone constitute a sealing of records as defined in Section 781 or 786 to mean that sealing of specified offenses

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<sup>2</sup> SB 81 (Skinner), Ch. 721, Stats. 2021.

<sup>3</sup> Limits the ability of the court to seal juvenile records if the subject of the record was found to be a ward of the court because the commission of an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code, section 707(b) committed after attaining 14 years of age. This limitation was added by Proposition 21 (2000).

is precluded. (*In re Taylor C.* (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 492.) Recently, another Court of Appeal decision affirmed that Section 782 is a general dismissal statute but noted that a court could grant a qualified dismissal rather than an unqualified one and that the limitations on such a dismissal would depend on the specific wording or scope of the court's dismissal. (*In re Parker B.*, 2026 WL 1208700.)

According to the sponsors of this bill, who were also the same sponsors of AB 2629 (Santiago), Chapter 970, Statutes of 20221, this language was not intended to limit the relief provided by a dismissal under Section 782. The amendment was intended to reaffirm existing law that dismissal pursuant to Section 782, and sealing of records pursuant to applicable sealing statutes, are related yet distinct procedures.

This bill states the intent of the Legislature to codify the holding of *In re David T.*, *supra*, and *People v. Haro*, *supra*, discussed above. The bill expressly states that Section 782 is a general dismissal statute and provides that an adjudication dismissed pursuant to that section shall be deemed to have not occurred and a person shall not suffer any adverse consequences in the future based on an adjudication dismissed pursuant to that section. This bill states the intent of the Legislature to disapprove the holdings of *In re Taylor C.*, *supra*, and *In re Parker B.*, *supra*, discussed above, and provides that a dismissal of a sustained petition pursuant to this section shall be deemed to constitute both a dismissal of the petition and a setting aside of any findings.

- 5) **Argument in Support:** According to *California Youth Defender Center*, the sponsor of this bill: "From its inception, section 782 has been considered by trial and appellate courts to be a 'general dismissal statute,' thereby affording broad relief, and A.B. 2629 was enacted based on this well-settled legal concept. To illustrate this point, the Court of Appeal in *In re David T.* held that section 782, like Penal Code section 1385, is a general dismissal statute, and once a juvenile court has determined in its discretion that 'the interest of justice and welfare of the person who is subject of the petition requires that dismissal,' such dismissal is intended to erase a prior adjudication, not merely reduce or mitigate it, and to thereby protect the person from any and all future adverse consequences based on that adjudication.

"Despite this long-standing principle that section 782 is a general dismissal statute, in 2024 an appellate court suggested that A.B. 2629 weakened, not strengthened, section 782.5 The appellate court misinterpreted paragraph (e) of section 782, which provides that dismissal 'does not alone constitute a sealing of records' -- language only intended to maintain the functional requirement that to achieve sealing of a dismissed petition, a sealing petition must also be filed. But *In re Taylor C.* suggested that A.B. 2629 eliminated the character of section 782 as a general dismissal statute and that the reasoning of *In re David T.* no longer applies.

"Not only did the appellate court misinterpret section 782(e), but it also disregarded the legislative intent of A.B. 2629, which was intended to strengthen and bring uniformity to section 782. It also misread the law's rehabilitative purpose and reduced the value of the law for young people who believed they had earned a true second chance.

"This troubling trend continued a week after Senate Bill 1285 (S.B. 1285) passed the Senate floor. A newly published decision, *In re Parker B.*, similarly misconstrued the interplay between section 782 and the juvenile record sealing statutes. The *Parker B.* court echoed *Taylor C.*'s misinterpretation of subdivision (e), mistakenly suggesting that it changed the

character of section 782 as a general dismissal statute and altered the long-established law that the granting of a dismissal under section 782 removes the restrictions on sealing that may be contained in the sealing statutes.

“Furthermore, the *Parker B.* court introduced an unprecedented, non-statutory distinction between ‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ dismissals. The court derived this concept from section 782, subdivision (a)(1), which states that a judge ‘may dismiss the petition or may set aside the findings and dismiss the petition....’ Legally, this phrasing simply reflects the procedural posture of the case at the time of dismissal: if the juvenile has not yet been declared a ward (i.e., the case is pre-adjudication), the court dismisses the petition under the first clause. If the juvenile has already been declared a ward (i.e., the case is post-adjudication), the court sets aside the findings and dismisses the petition (or specified counts in the petition, and the findings underlying those counts) under the second clause.

“Although the *Parker B.* court initially acknowledged that this posture-based interpretation aligned with the statute’s literal wording, its final holding veered sharply from its own textual analysis. The court held that a post-adjudication dismissal automatically sets aside findings and dismisses the petition unless the juvenile court explicitly indicates a narrower, ‘qualified’ intent. Because the trial court in *Parker B.* did not explicitly limit its order, the appellate court characterized it as an ‘unqualified dismissal.’

“In essence, the *Parker B.* holding creates a legal fiction. Since enactment of 782 in 1971, the statute has operated strictly as a uniform, general dismissal tool. Its dual phrasing accommodates the procedural reality of the case—either pre- or post-adjudication. The statute grants the juvenile court no discretion to craft a ‘qualified’ hybrid post-adjudication dismissal that leaves findings and collateral consequences intact. The court’s only actual discretion, if granting a dismissal, is to either dismiss the petition in its entirety or, upon proper request, dismiss specific counts within it, along with dismissing the findings underlying the dismissed petition or counts.

“S.B. 1285 is a narrowly tailored bill intended to correct the judicial misinterpretations contained in the *Taylor C.* and *Parker B.* opinions. S.B.1285 does not create new law; rather, it reaffirms the longstanding understanding that section 782 is a general dismissal statute, and a dismissal of a sustained petition shall be deemed to constitute both a dismissal and a setting aside of any findings, as the statute has been interpreted since its enactment in 1971. Further, S.B. 1285 codifies the holdings of *In re David T.*, *People v. Haro*, and other appellate cases that an adjudication dismissed pursuant to section 782 shall be deemed to have not occurred, protecting individuals from future adverse consequences based on that adjudication.”

6) **Argument in Opposition:** None

7) **Related Legislation:**

- a) AB 1886 (Elhawary) would remove the exclusion of wards that have been ordered to be under the supervision of the probation officer for placement in specified out-of-home placements from the 12-month limitation on term of probation in existing law. AB 1886 is pending hearing in Senate Public Safety Committee.

- b) SB 1009 (Becker) would prohibit the court from ordering that a minor be detained in a juvenile hall unless it makes a finding that a less restrictive alternative to detention in the juvenile hall is unsuitable. SB 1009 is pending hearing by this committee.

**8) Prior Legislation:**

- a) AB 2626 (Santiago), Chapter 970, Statutes of 2022, among other things, added specified mitigating circumstances for the court to consider when determining whether it is in the interests of justice to dismiss a juvenile petition.
- b) AB 1537 (Cunningham), Chapter 50, Statutes of 2019, expanded a prosecutor's ability to request to access, inspect, or use specified sealed juvenile records if the prosecutor has reason to believe that the record may be necessary to meet a legal obligation to disclose favorable or exculpatory evidence to a defendant in a criminal case.
- c) AB 529 (Stone), Chapter 685, Statutes of 2017, required the sealing of records relating to dismissed or unsustained juvenile court petitions and relating to diversion and supervision programs, as specified.
- d) SB 312 (Skinner), Chapter 679, Statutes of 2017, authorized a sealing procedure for juveniles convicted of a serious or violent felony and allowed for access by the prosecutor in order to determine whether they have a disclosure obligation.
- e) AB 666 (Stone), Chapter 368, Statutes of 2015, among other things, specified that the prohibition against automatic sealing of a record or dismissing a petition if the petition was sustained based on the commission of a specified serious or violent offense that was committed when the individual was 14 years of age or older does not apply if the finding on that offense was dismissed or was reduced to a lesser offense.
- f) SB 1038 (Leno), Chapter 249, Statutes of 2014, provided for the automatic dismissal of juvenile petitions and sealing of records in cases where a juvenile offender successfully completes probation for any offense other than a specified violent or serious offense

**REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:**

**Support**

California Youth Defender Center (Sponsor)  
ACLU California Action  
Alianza for Opportunity  
All of US or None Orange County  
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color  
Attorney-at-law, Michael Whelan  
California Alliance of Child and Family Services  
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice  
California Coalition for Women Prisoners  
California Public Defenders Association

Californians for Safety and Justice  
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice  
Children's Advocacy Institute  
Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice (CURYJ)  
Community Interventions  
Courage California  
East Bay Community Law Center  
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights  
Empowering Women Impacted by Incarceration  
Families Inspiring Reentry & Reunification 4 Everyone  
Felony Murder Elimination Project  
Fresh Lifelines for Youth  
Fresh Lifelines for Youth (FLY)  
Friends Committee on Legislation of California  
Glide  
Glide Foundation  
Haywood Burns Institute  
Idco  
Initiate Justice  
Justice2jobs Coalition  
Juvenile Justice Advocates of California  
LA Defensa  
Law Foundation of Silicon Valley  
Legal Services for Prisoner With Children  
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children / All of US or None  
Local 148 Los Angeles County Public Defender's Union  
Milpa Collective  
National Compadres Network  
Rubicon Programs  
San Francisco Public Defender  
San Francisco Public Defender's Office  
San Mateo County Private Defender Program, Kathryn Yolken  
San Quentin Skunkworks  
Silicon Valley De-bug  
Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition  
Smart Justice California, a Project of Beyond Impact  
The Collective for Liberatory Lawyering  
Youth Forward  
Youth Law Center  
Youth Leadership Institute

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