

SENATE PRIVACY, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION COMMITTEE
Senator Christopher Cabaldon, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session

SB 1095 (Pérez)
Version: March 25, 2026
Hearing Date: April 13, 2026
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
CK

SUBJECT

Fusion centers

DIGEST

This bill regulates the activities of California-based fusion centers, including imposition of various restrictions on information sharing and reporting requirements.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fusion centers are regional centers owned and operated by state and local entities with support from the federal government. They were established with the goal of sharing and analyzing threat-related information at all levels of government, with a particular focus on counterterrorism. California currently operates at least six fusion centers throughout the state.

Research and investigations into fusion centers by both private organizations and the United States Senate have raised serious concerns about the utility and efficacy of these centers and their commitment to upholding civil rights. One increasing concern is the use of these information-sharing entities to conduct immigration enforcement activity despite the edict of the California Values Act (SB 54, De León, Ch. 495, Stats. 2017), which limits local law enforcement agencies' sharing of certain information with federal immigration agencies, and prohibits law enforcement agencies from using their resources for immigration enforcement or from cooperating in immigration enforcement activities.

This bill places a series of restrictions on the conduct of these fusion centers and imposes a number of transparency requirements, including annual reporting and audits on the conduct and protocol of these regional centers.

The bill is sponsored by the California Immigrant Policy Center, the San Francisco Public Defenders Office, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, and the Council on

American-Islamic Relations, California. It is supported by many advocacy organizations, including the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights and Asian Americans Advancing Justice, Southern California. No timely opposition has been received by the Committee. Should the bill pass out of this Committee, it will next be heard by the Senate Public Safety Committee.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW

Existing federal law:

- 1) Establishes the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which gives the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsibility for integrating law enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to the homeland. (P.L. 107-296.)
- 2) Establishes the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, which established the National Counterterrorism Center as the coordinator at the federal level for terrorism information and assessment. (P.L. 108-458)

Existing state law:

- 1) Establishes the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) within the office of the Governor, which shall be considered a law enforcement organization as required for receipt of criminal intelligence information. OES is responsible for the state's emergency and disaster response services for natural, technological, or man-made disasters and emergencies, including responsibility for activities necessary to prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of emergencies and disasters to people and property. (Gov. Code § 8585.)
- 2) Requires OES to establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (CCIC). CCIC's primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California's economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. It serves as the central organizing hub of state government's cybersecurity activities and coordinates information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, and nongovernmental organizations. (Gov. Code § 8586.5(a).)
- 3) Requires CCIC to operate in close coordination with the California State Threat Assessment System (STAC), a regional fusion center, and DHS. (Gov. Code § 8586.5(b).)

This bill:

- 1) Prohibits a fusion center operating in California from participating in activity, cooperating, or disclosing or sharing information with any governmental entity, or a contractor for any governmental entity, when participation, cooperation, or disclosure involves either of the following:
 - a) Assisting or furthering immigration enforcement, unless pursuant to judicial warrant or court order.
 - b) Investigating, interrogating, detaining, identifying, surveilling, detecting, or arresting people in violation of the prohibition against racial or identity profiling as provided in Section 13519 .4 of the Penal Code.
- 2) Prohibits a fusion center from allowing a governmental entity, contractor for a governmental entity, or private entity to work inside the fusion center when the Office of Emergency Services (OES) knows or has reason to know that the entity or contractor is presently engaged in or intends to engage in unlawful intelligence-gathering activity resulting in the violation of the constitutional or civil rights of a resident of California.
- 3) Prohibits fusion centers from providing office space for agencies engaged in immigration enforcement, or personnel, agents or subcontractors acting on their behalf, for use within the fusion centers.
- 4) Authorizes state elected officials, local elected officials, and their staff to enter any fusion center for inspections, without prior notice or authorization.
- 5) Requires OES, starting on January 1, 2027, and each year thereafter, to submit a report to the Department of Justice (DOJ) that includes all the following information collected from fusion centers:
 - a) A list of all federal, state, and local governmental entities and data brokers, including their contractors and vendors, that participate in fusion centers, a summary of their role and function, and any proposed or existing memorandum of understanding (MOU) or written agreement or material amendments to an existing MOU between these entities regarding participation in fusion centers.
 - b) Number of requests for information and reports submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker, regardless of the reason.
 - c) The general types of information collected by state law enforcement agencies and shared with federal law enforcement agencies while participating in fusion centers.
 - d) A summary highlighting the principal reasons that a governmental entity or data broker is requesting information from the fusion center.
 - e) How requests for information are submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker and how quickly those are processed.

- f) An assessment of how fusion centers process incoming requests for information from governmental entities and data brokers.
 - g) The number of times a federal law enforcement agency requested information or assessments from state law enforcement agencies and whether the state law enforcement agency determined that the reasonable suspicion standard was met for the activity.
 - h) Any policies and standards for the use and retention of data gathered, processed, or analyzed by fusion centers.
 - i) A catalog of the information requested by and provided to requesting governmental entities and data brokers and a list of the personal information that is reasonably believed to have been part of those requests.
 - j) The process for validating the authenticity of the requesting governmental entities and data brokers seeking information requests from the fusion center.
 - k) Whether a reasonable suspicion standard was met before state law enforcement agencies collected, maintained, or disseminated personal information through fusion centers.
 - l) The types of agencies that staff each fusion center, including, but not limited to, the number of staff per agency and a staffing chart or flowchart detailing staffing and how decisions are made about responding to requests from governmental entities or data brokers.
 - m) The number of actual or potential violations of state or local laws, policies, or department orders or procedures, the actions taken by the state law enforcement agency to address actual or potential violations, and recommendations to prevent future violations.
 - n) A certification, under penalty of perjury, that the fusion center has not engaged in any acts intended to influence the decisions or assessments of the Department of Justice.
- 6) Requires DOJ to conduct an annual audit based on the above report and to submit it to the Legislature, as provided.
- 7) Provides that all records related to fusion centers are public records for purposes of the California Public Records Act.
- 8) Prohibits OES, fusion centers, and DOJ from disclosing the name, address, social security number, or other unique personal identifying information of individuals stopped, searched, or subjected to a property seizure, for the above purposes.
- 9) Defines the relevant terms, including:
- a) "Fusion center" means a state-owned center operated by the Office of Emergency Services and involving a law enforcement agency and a governmental entity that gather, analyze, and share information,

including, but not limited to, the State Threat Assessment Center, the Central California Intelligence Center, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, and the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center.

- b) “Governmental entity” means the federal government, any state government other than California, any local government outside of California, and any agency, subdivision, contractor, or representative thereof, or any agreed upon or functional agent thereof.
- c) “Immigration enforcement” includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal civil immigration law, and also includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal criminal immigration law that penalizes a person’s presence in, entry, or reentry to, or employment in, the United States.
- d) “Personal information” means any information that is maintained by an agency that relates to, describes, or is reasonably capable of identifying or describing, an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s name, social security number, physical description, home address, biometric information, geolocation data, home telephone number, education, financial matters, and medical or employment history. It includes statements made by, or attributed to, the individual and constitutionally protected activities or involvement engaged in by the individual.

COMMENTS

1. Fusion centers in California: what and where are they?

According to the Department of Homeland Security:

Fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local entities with support from federal partners in the form of deployed personnel, training, technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances, and connectivity to federal systems. Fusion centers provide the federal government with critical state and local information and subject-matter expertise that it did not receive in the past – enabling the effective communication of locally generated threat-related information to the federal government. Fusion centers receive information from a variety of sources, including suspicious activity reporting (SAR) information from stakeholders within their jurisdictions, as well as federal information and intelligence. They analyze the information and develop relevant products to disseminate to their customers. These products assist homeland

security partners at all levels of government to identify and address immediate and emerging threats.¹

Fusion centers are designated by the governor of their state, and the federal government recognizes these designations and has a shared responsibility with state and local governments to support the national network of fusion centers.

There are two types of fusion centers:

- **Primary Fusion Centers:** A primary fusion center typically provides information sharing and analysis for an entire state. These centers are the highest priority for the allocation of available federal resources, including the deployment of personnel and connectivity with federal data systems.
- **Recognized Fusion Centers:** A recognized fusion center typically provides information sharing and analysis for a major urban area. As the Federal Government respects the authority of state governments to designate fusion centers, any designated fusion center not designated as a primary fusion center is referred to as a recognized fusion center.²


The identified fusion centers operating in California are:

- California State Threat Assessment Center (Primary)
- Central California Intelligence Center; Sacramento, CA (Recognized)
- Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center; Los Angeles, CA (Recognized)
- Northern California Regional Intelligence Center; San Francisco, CA (Recognized)
- Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center; Orange County, CA (Recognized)
- San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center; San Diego, CA (Recognized)³

¹ Handout, *State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers* (July 2012) DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Fusion%20Centers%20Handout_0.pdf. All internet citations are current as of April 4, 2026.

² *Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information* (December 22, 2025) DHS, <https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information>.

³ *Ibid.*



According to OES, the State Threat Assessment Center (STAC) is California’s state primary fusion center, as designated by the Governor of California, and is operated by the California Highway Patrol, OES, and DOJ. It serves as “California’s information sharing clearinghouse of strategic threat analysis and situational awareness reporting to statewide leadership and the public safety community in support of efforts to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to all crimes and all hazards impacting California

citizens and critical infrastructure, while preserving civil liberties, individual privacy, and constitutional rights.”⁴

2. Concerns about fusion centers: privacy, civil rights, and mission creep

A report by the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project asserts that fusion centers are being used to circumvent sanctuary city laws. The report found:

- Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) fusion centers spend over \$400 million each year to expand federal, state, and local intelligence sharing, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
- Fusion centers enable ICE to co-opt local police databases and surveillance tools (like facial recognition) that otherwise couldn’t be used for deportation purposes.
- Fusion center participants routinely give ICE sensitive data, violating state and local protections for undocumented immigrants.
- Local police officers use fusion centers to encourage ICE to target suspects when officers can’t find enough evidence to bring charges, effectively deporting their cold cases.
- Fusion centers’ opacity allows them to routinely violate state and local civil rights laws without consequence.⁵

The Brennan Center conducted an exhaustive review of the work of fusion centers and how it has strayed from the original purposes of their creation:

While the federal government initially promoted them as hubs for sharing counterterrorism information, fusion centers quickly expanded their missions to include any crimes or hazards.

DHS provides these centers with funding, personnel, and access to federal intelligence, but it has failed to ensure that they have used these resources appropriately. As a result, fusion centers have long produced flawed analysis, abused their authorities to monitor people engaged in First Amendment-protected activities, and leaked sensitive law enforcement information. This domestic intelligence model has undermined Americans’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

Fusion centers have repeatedly targeted minority communities and protest movements under the guise of counterterrorism or public safety.

⁴ State Threat Assessment Center, OES, <https://www.caloes.ca.gov/office-of-the-director/operations/homeland-security/state-threat-assessment-center/>.

⁵ Eleni Manis, et al., *Deportation Data Centers: How Fusion Centers Circumvent Sanctuary City Laws* (November 19, 2024) Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/6786da0226ec38320c099635/t/68a7599e6067ca6214d163eb/1755797918060/2024.11.19_STOP%2BReport_Deportation%2BData%2BCenters_final.pdf.

In their early years, they often singled out American Muslims for unwarranted scrutiny. Their bulletins have regularly painted racial and environmental justice activists as menacing threats. Fusion center reports are widely disseminated to local police and federal law enforcement, likely contributing to their heavy-handed responses to these protests in recent years. The participation of private companies, including some that have been the subjects of protests, in fusion centers raises the possibility that these operations sometimes serve private interests rather than public safety.

Fusion centers continue to be susceptible to abuse as protest movements react to events, creating new targets for unwarranted scrutiny. For example, fusion centers have amplified FBI and DHS threat warnings that falsely lump pro-choice activists together with abortion foes as potential “abortion-related violent extremists,” even though only anti-abortion militants have a history of engaging in deadly violence. ¹ As states criminalize abortion, investigations of those seeking, providing, or even just supporting access to reproductive services will fit within fusion centers’ “all crimes” remit,² making it likely that fusion centers will heed law enforcement requests for assistance.

At the same time, there is little to suggest that fusion centers have provided meaningful assistance to federal counterterrorism efforts. And even as they have broadened their missions beyond counterterrorism, there is no evidence that they have contributed substantially to reducing or solving serious crime. They do, however, facilitate broad, unregulated information sharing among a variety of public and private entities with little oversight or public accountability, which poses a serious security liability that was realized when hackers breached a fusion center contractor in 2020, exposing hundreds of thousands of sensitive records from the FBI, DHS, and other law enforcement agencies.⁶

Critical review is not isolated to such outside organizations. An investigation by the United States Senate, initiated by Republican Senator Tom Coburn, found government waste, lack of identifiable success in achieving its mission, and resistance to meaningful oversight:

A two-year bipartisan investigation by the U. S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found that Department of Homeland Security efforts to engage state and local intelligence “fusion centers” has

⁶ Mike German, Rachel Levinson-Waldman, & Kaylana Mueller-Hsia, *Ending Fusion Center Abuses* (December 15, 2022) Brennan Center, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/ending-fusion-center-abuses>.

not yielded significant useful information to support federal counterterrorism intelligence efforts.

“It’s troubling that the very ‘fusion’ centers that were designed to share information in a post-9/11 world have become part of the problem. Instead of strengthening our counterterrorism efforts, they have too often wasted money and stepped on Americans’ civil liberties,” said Senator Tom Coburn, the Subcommittee’s ranking member who initiated the investigation.

The investigation determined that senior DHS officials were aware of the problems hampering effective counterterrorism work with the fusion centers, but did not always inform Congress of the issues, nor ensure the problems were fixed in a timely manner.

“Unfortunately, DHS has resisted oversight of these centers. The Department opted not to inform Congress or the public of serious problems plaguing its fusion center and broader intelligence efforts. When this Subcommittee requested documents that would help it identify these issues, the Department initially resisted turning them over, arguing that they were protected by privilege, too sensitive to share, were protected by confidentiality agreements, or did not exist at all. The American people deserve better. I hope this report will help generate the reforms that will help keep our country safe,” Dr. Coburn said.⁷

3. Responding to concerns regarding California fusion centers

This bill seeks to directly regulate these fusion centers to address the problems cited above. It first places a series of restrictions on data collection and sharing by these fusion centers. The bill places strong prohibitions on engaging in activity that amounts to unlawful profiling or that assists or furthers immigration enforcement, unless required pursuant to a judicial warrant or court order. Fusion centers are prohibited from allowing entities that are engaging in, or have an intention to engage in, unlawful intelligence-gathering to work within the centers or to provide space to agencies engaging in immigration enforcement. These are certainly important guardrails, many of which are already required by the law, including the California Values Act.

The bill also includes provisions specifically looking for greater transparency. First, it requires OES to compile and submit to DOJ a comprehensive report of information collected from fusion centers. This is to include a listing of entities, both public and

⁷ *Investigative Report Criticizes Counterterrorism Reporting, Waste at State & Local Intelligence Fusion Centers* (October 3, 2012) Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/rep/investigative-report-criticizes-counterterrorism-reporting-waste-at-state-local-intelligence-fusion-centers/>.

private, that participate; the protocols for collection, use, and retention of information; and details of the types and numbers of requests being made of the centers. One specific item required to be included in the report is: “A catalog of the information requested by and provided to requesting governmental entities and data brokers and a list of the personal information that is reasonably believed to have been part of those requests.” Given the likely sensitive nature of some of this information, more clarity might be needed to understand exactly what this is intended to require.

Once the report is submitted, DOJ is thereafter required to conduct an audit and to submit it to the Legislature.

The bill also explicitly provides that any state or local elected official, or their staff, may enter any fusion center for inspections at any time. While access to these facilities by elected officials is arguably an important cornerstone to effective oversight, the breadth of this provision may be overly broad. For instance, a staffer for a locally elected school board official is not likely in the best position to oversee such operations and may cause an unnecessary disruption without commensurate benefit to the state. The author may wish to narrow this provision.

The bill tries to strike a balance between more transparency and the privacy of individuals’ information by making all records related to fusion centers public records but prohibiting the disclosure of specified information that would identify individuals. However, as pointed out by Oakland Privacy, writing in a support if amended position, fusion centers are already subject to the California Public Records Act.

According to the author:

Fusion Centers have operated for many years with limited accountability and oversight. Originally established to support counterterrorism efforts following the September 11 terrorist attacks, these state-owned and operated data-sharing hubs have expanded in scope. In some instances, concerns have been raised about their use to target minority communities, track activists and protesters, and unlawfully support federal immigration enforcement activities. These Centers have little to no outside oversight, creating conditions where state laws may be inconsistently applied, information could be improperly obtained or shared, and resources may be used in coordination with federal and out-of-state entities. At the same time, questions have been raised about their effectiveness at preventing terrorist activity or reducing crime.

SB 1095 seeks to address these concerns by prohibiting California’s Fusion Centers from sharing sensitive personal information for the purposes of immigration enforcement and racial or identity profiling, and by requiring an annual audit of their activities. This approach aims to strengthen

transparency and accountability, align operations with state law, and ensure Californians' constitutional right to privacy is protected, while helping to maintain public safety.

In response to many of these same concerns, Senator Sabrina Cervantes recently successfully requested a state audit to investigate the operations and status of fusion centers in California arguing they have operated in secrecy for three decades:

No single piece of federal or state legislation established this national network of fusion centers, defined its mission, or authorized it to operate as a decentralized domestic intelligence collection mechanism feeding the federal intelligence community with information gathered from every part of American life. The network operates in secret and under ambiguous lines of authority. It includes not only federal, state, and local law enforcement, but also other public and private entities that have no legal or statutory authority to collect or disseminate intelligence about Americans. The public has little access to information regarding what their local fusion centers do in their communities or even the individuals who work there. Fusion centers were originally created with the laudable goal of preventing terrorism. However, over the nearly three decades since their establishment and with limited formal oversight, these centers have seen a significant expansion in their surveillance and targeting activities to include broad domestic activities. The infrastructure established at fusion centers is designed to gather considerable information about individuals' identities, movements, activities, and relationships from various aspects of their lives, and to collect and collate this data to multiple levels of government and private entities for analysis and decision-making.⁸

Given that the audit has been approved, the author may wish to consider removing the auditing piece to allow for the auditor to provide a clearer picture of exactly what activities these centers are engaged in. Thereafter, with both the audit and OES report in hand, the Legislature will be better situated to identify the appropriate steps moving forward. As Oakland Privacy writes:

On March 24th, a day before this bill went into print, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee green lighted a state audit of California's fusion centers based largely on the work of the Brennan Center documenting fusion center abuses. The audit request was submitted by Senator Sabrina Cervantes of Riverside and we were pleased to support it.

⁸ *Letter to the Joint Legislative Audit Committee* (February 11, 2026) Senator Sabrina Cervantes, https://sd31.senate.ca.gov/sites/sd31.senate.ca.gov/files/pdf/Sen%20Cervantes%20JLAC%20Audit%20Request%20California%20Fusion%20Centers%202.12.26_0.pdf.

The state audit request comes not as a way to delay state action, but to better inform it. Ten years after starting to think about and research fusion centers, I still can't say that I truly understand the scope of their activities. The audit request that was approved is broad and comprehensive and in many cases similar to the report envisioned in Senate Bill 1095.

Given that it is unlikely that California will want to have the State Auditor and the Department of Justice doing side by side audits, and that the purpose of a state audit is to put together recommendations about policies to pursue based on the findings, it seems necessary to re-work Senate Bill 1095 at this point.

4. Stakeholder positions

A large coalition of community groups and advocacy organizations, including the Immigrant Legal Resource Center and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, writes in strong support:

Fusion Centers have spied on people engaged in First-Amendment protected activities. Fusion Centers have a documented history of surveillance abuses, including targeting Muslim and Black, Indigenous and People of Color communities, tracking protestors, and casting peaceful activities as potential threats. For example, the Northern California Fusion Center issued multiple warnings to 14,000 police officers stating local Black Lives Matter rallies were "dangerous."

Fusion Centers have circumvented our local and state sanctuary and privacy laws. In Orange County, ICE agents asked a police officer to run searches of individuals at an Orange County fusion center, highlighting how our personal information collected by local and state agencies is being shared with federal agencies despite our local and state laws preventing this information sharing without a valid judicial warrant. In San Francisco, local law enforcement circumvented a local ban on facial recognition by asking for help from a Fusion Center. For Trump's mass deportation regime to be successful, he needs to commandeer local and state resources, including our personal information collected by local and state agencies.

These practices threaten constitutional rights, privacy, and public trust by providing a backdoor to evade California's limits on mass surveillance and local participation in deportations. We must protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all who call California home.

SB 1095 will expose the truth about what is happening behind closed doors at California's Fusion Centers, or state surveillance centers, and protect Californians from abuses and violations of their rights.

Writing in support, the Transitions Clinic Network argues:

SB 1095 offers a clear and practical solution: prohibiting state Fusion Centers from participating in, cooperating with, disclosing, or sharing information for federal immigration enforcement and racial or identity profiling unless required by a valid judicial warrant. The bill bans office space for immigration enforcement agencies in Fusion Centers, bars out-of-state, federal, or private entities from operating inside Fusion Centers if they are engaged in unlawful activities that violate constitutional rights, authorizes state and local elected officials to enter and inspect Fusion Centers, and requires an annual audit to ensure transparency, accountability, and compliance with state law.

SUPPORT

California Immigrant Policy Center (co-sponsor)
Council on American-Islamic Relations, California (co-sponsor)
Immigrant Legal Resource Center (co-sponsor)
San Francisco Public Defender's Office (co-sponsor)
18 Million Rising
67 Sueños
Access Reproductive Justice
All of US or None (HQ)
Asian Americans Advancing Justice-southern California
Buen Vecino
California Coalition for Women Prisoners
Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law
Clean Carwash Worker Center
Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice (CURYJ)
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Empowering Marginalized Asian Communities
Felony Murder Elimination Project
Freedom for Immigrants
Glide
Harbor Institute for Immigrant and Economic Justice
Health in Partnership
Immigrant Defense Project
Justice2jobs Coalition
LA Defensa
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children

National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON)
New Light Wellness
ORALE: Organizing Rooted in Abolition Liberation and Empowerment
Orange County Rapid Response Network
Privacy Defense Alliance
San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium
Secure Justice
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network (SIREN)
Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition
South Bay People Power
Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC)
Transitions Clinic Network
Valor US
Viet Rise
1 Individual

OPPOSITION

None received

RELATED LEGISLATION

SB 1181 (Hurtado, 2026) requires OES, in consultation with the State Department of Education, to establish the Central Valley School Safety Coordination Pilot Program for the purpose of studying and evaluating improved communication pathways between local educational agencies, as defined, and regional fusion centers regarding credible safety threats affecting school communities. SB 1181 is currently in the Senate Emergency Management Committee.

AB 474 (Rodriguez, 2023) would have required STAC and OES to prioritize, to the greatest extent possible, cooperation with state and local efforts to disrupt and dismantle criminal networks trafficking opioid drugs that pose a threat to California. AB 474 was vetoed by Governor Newsom, who stated:

The STAC currently has the authority to address and prioritize opioid trafficking, and it already does. Furthermore, the threats facing California are constantly evolving, and law enforcement agencies need flexibility to shift priorities to meet this ever-changing threat landscape. This bill would limit this flexibility, with a detrimental impact on public safety and national security.

For these reasons, I cannot sign this bill.
