

Date of Hearing: June 22, 2026

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

Lori D. Wilson, Chair

SB 1013 (Cervantes) – As Amended June 15, 2026

SENATE VOTE: 28-9

SUBJECT: Automated license plate recognition systems

SUMMARY: Requires operators and end-users of automated license plate recognition (ALPR) systems to bolster their safeguards relating to employee access and usage of such systems; requires the Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct random annual audits of public agency operators and end-users to ensure compliance with their usage and privacy policies; imposes additional use restrictions on public agencies and places retention limits on ALPR data, with exceptions. Specifically, **this bill:**

- 1) Provides that the current requirements for ALPR operators and end-users to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices must include:
 - a) Safeguards for managing which employees can see the data from their systems, including requiring supervisory approval, robust authentication protocols for establishing an account to access an ALPR system, and tracking searches of ALPR information made by employees; and,
 - b) Requiring data security training and data privacy training for all employees who access ALPR information.
- 2) Requires DOJ to conduct annual random audits on public agency ALPR operators and end-users to determine whether they have implemented and are adhering to a usage and privacy policy in compliance with the law. This is contingent upon appropriation, as provided.
- 3) Provides that usage and privacy policies shall be implemented under the supervision of DOJ, as applicable.
- 4) Requires that ALPR operators record the case file number that justifies each search query. A query shall not be allowed without a log entry with a valid and current case file number from the agency conducting the query. In the event of a search query that is conducted as part of an inter-agency task force established by the Attorney General and overseen by the office's Bureau of Investigation, in lieu of a case file number, the log entry shall include the name of the task force and the name of the bureau commander in charge of the task force.
- 5) Defines "case file number" to mean a reference number pertaining to a specific law enforcement or public safety incident or investigation. Provides that usage and privacy policies must indicate the purpose for which specified employees and contractors are granted access to, and permission to use, ALPR information.
- 6) Provides that, beginning January 1, 2027, all new, updated, expansions of, or addendums of contractual agreements with ALPR vendors, manufacturers, or suppliers shall mandate that no default access is provided to any national ALPR database and that an agency's collected scans are by default not accessible to any other agency. A law enforcement agency may

manually implement agency to agency sharing with other California state law enforcement agencies only as authorized by Department of Justice General Order 2023-05.

- 7) Provides that ALPR information may be used by a law enforcement agency only for purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense or locating an individual who has been reported as missing to a law enforcement agency.
- 8) Requires law enforcement agency ALPR operators and end-users to establish a maximum data retention period for ALPR information.
- 9) Prohibits a public agency from retaining ALPR information for more than 30 days if it does not match information on an authorized hot list.
- 10) Requires a public agency, as of January 1, 2027, to delete all ALPR information, within 14 days, unless it is retained in the evidence file of an active investigation or criminal proceeding or matches information on an authorized hot list.
- 11) Carves the following entities out of the definition of ALPR end-user and ALPR operator:
 - a) A public transit operator when subject to Section 40240 of the Vehicle Code;
 - b) A local department of transportation or public works department when subject to specified provisions of law;
 - c) An airport or airport operator when collecting, accessing, or using ALPR information solely for parking access control, fee calculation, lost-ticket resolution, fraud prevention, or transaction dispute resolution in an airport parking facility.
- 12) Carves the following entities out of the definition of “public agency”:
 - a) A transportation agency when subject to Section 31490 of the Streets and Highways Code;
 - a) A public transit operator when subject to Section 40240 of the Vehicle Code;
 - b) A local department of transportation or public works department when subject to specified provisions of law.
- 13) Defines “hot list” to mean a list or lists of license plates of vehicles of interest against which the ALPR system is comparing vehicles on the roadways. Authorized hot lists are limited to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) list, The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) list, the Stolen Vehicle System (SVS), California Department of Justice lists, official alerts, including AMBER, Silver, Feather, Blue, Yellow, Ebony, and any new alerts authorized by the Legislature, and custom BOLO lists that pertain solely to missing and at-risk persons, witness locations, burglaries, grand theft, and violent crimes.

EXISTING LAW:

- 1) Defines “automated license plate recognition system” or “ALPR system” to mean a searchable computerized database resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. “ALPR information” means information or data collected through the use of an ALPR system. “ALPR operator”

means a person that operates an ALPR system, except as specified. “ALPR end-user” means a person that accesses or uses an ALPR system, except as specified. The definitions for both ALPR operator and ALPR end-user exclude transportation agencies when subject to Section 31490 of the Streets and Highways Code. (Civil Code section (CIV) 1798.90.5.)

- 2) Requires an ALPR operator to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR operators must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain specified elements. CIV 1798.90.51
- 3) Requires an ALPR operator, if it accesses or provides access to ALPR information, to do both of the following:
 - a) Maintain a record of that access. At a minimum, the record shall include all of the following:
 - i. The date and time the information is accessed;
 - ii. The license plate number or other data elements used to query the ALPR system;
 - iii. The username of the person who accesses the information, and, as applicable, the organization or entity with whom the person is affiliated; and,
 - iv. The purpose for accessing the information.
 - b) Require that ALPR information only be used for the authorized purposes described in the usage and privacy policy. (CIV 1798.90.52)
- 4) Requires ALPR end-users to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR end-users must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the access, use, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain elements. (CIV 1798.90.53)
- 5) Provides that a public agency shall not sell, share, or transfer ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law. For purposes of this section, the provision of data hosting or towing services shall not be considered the sale, sharing, or transferring of ALPR information. (CIV 1798.90.55)
- 6) Authorizes the Department of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to retain license plate data captured by a license plate reader for no more than 60 days, except in circumstances when the data is being used as evidence or for all felonies being investigated, including, but not limited to, auto theft, homicides, kidnapping, burglaries, elder and juvenile abductions, Amber Alerts, and Blue Alerts. (Vehicle Code section (VEH) 2413(b))

- 7) Prohibits CHP from selling license plate reader data for any purpose and from making the data available to an agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an individual who is not a law enforcement officer. The data may be used by a law enforcement agency only for purposes of locating vehicles or persons, when either are reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense. (VEH 2413(c))
- 8) Requires CHP to monitor internal use of the license plate reader data to prevent unauthorized use. (VEH 2413(d))
- 9) Requires CHP to annually report the license plate reader practices and usage, including the number of license plate reader data disclosures, a record of the agencies to which data was disclosed and for what purpose, and any changes in policy that affect privacy concerns to the Legislature. (VEH 2413(e))
- 10) Establishes the data breach notification law, which requires any agency, person, or business that owns, licenses, or maintains data including personal information to disclose a breach, as provided. (CIV 1798.29(a), (b), (c) and 1798.82(a), (b), (c).) Includes within the definition of “personal information” ALPR data when combined with an individual’s first name or first initial and last name when either piece of data is not encrypted. CIV 1798.29(g), 1798.82(h)

FISCAL EFFECT:

According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

- Unknown General Fund cost pressures, likely in the low millions of dollars annually, for the DOJ to conduct random audits of public agencies that are ALPR operators or end-users. DOJ costs would only be incurred to the extent sufficient funds are appropriated in the annual Budget Act for these purposes, and the magnitude of this funding would determine how many audits could be conducted in a given year.
- Unknown, potentially significant state-mandated local costs for affected local public agencies who are ALPR operators or end-users to comply with the requirements of this bill, including costs to revise policies and procedures to ensure ALPR information is not retained longer than 30 days, to revise security procedures and practices to restrict access to ALPR information, and to develop and conduct training for all employees who access ALPR information, as specified. These local costs may be subject to reimbursement by the state, subject to a determination by the Commission on State Mandates. (General Fund)
Unknown, potentially significant costs in the aggregate, for state agencies who are ALPR operators or end-users to comply with the requirements of the bill. The California Highway Patrol indicates that any costs would be absorbable within existing resources. (various funds)

COMMENTS: ALPRs utilize high-speed camera systems combined with computer algorithms to capture images of license plates, log their GPS coordinates, and cross-reference them against law enforcement databases ("hot lists"). Modern ALPR systems can capture up to 1,800 plates per minute at speeds exceeding 120 mph, and are deployed via stationary poles, police cruisers, or mobile devices.

While law enforcement relies on ALPR data to track stolen vehicles, apprehend suspects, or locate missing individuals under Amber Alerts, the widespread accumulation of location data on individuals not suspected of any crime has raised persistent civil liberties and privacy concerns.

Law enforcement agencies' use of ALPR was prevalent across the United States by the mid-2000s. The 2007 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey indicated that as of 2007, 48% of law enforcement agencies with more than 1,000 sworn officers were regularly using ALPR readers, alongside 32% of agencies with greater than 500 officers, but less than 1,000.

California's use of ALPRs and legislative response: ACLU indicated in a 2013 report that law enforcement was collecting and storing ALPR images related to individuals not suspected of a crime, and that this data could be used inappropriately to monitor the movements of individuals such as ex-spouses, neighbors, and other associates. Such information could be used to locate places people regularly visit, to determine their acquaintances, and to blackmail them.

Out of increasing concern surrounding the privacy of individuals' data collected through ALPR systems, SB 34 (Hill), Chapter 532, Statutes of 2015, was enacted. SB 34 imposed a range of privacy protections on ALPR data, including requiring ALPR operators to secure information collected by ALPR systems with reasonable operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure confidentiality and integrity. According to Senator Hill, "California law has not kept up with the rapid adoption of the technology. Except for the California Highway Patrol and transportation agencies, current California law doesn't require any privacy safeguards or establish any protocols for the use of ALPR systems. Not only has the law failed to keep up with the quick adoption of ALPR, but the entities using ALPR have also been slow in crafting their own internal policies. For example, according to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, only 48% of police agencies across the country have developed policies that govern ALPR use and privacy."

In 2019, the State Auditor reviewed four local law enforcement agencies' use of ALPR and found that these agencies were accumulating massive amounts of data unrelated to criminal investigations. Also, the Auditor found that none of the agencies they reviewed were complying with the requirements set forth in SB 34, and that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) had no ALPR policy at all. The other three agencies did not completely or clearly specify who has system access, who has system oversight, or how to destroy ALPR data. For example, of the 320 million images LAPD had collected, only 400,000 generated an immediate match against a hot list. In addition, the State Auditor conducted a statewide survey of law enforcement agencies and found that 70% operate or plan to operate an ALPR system, and that 84% of those operating a system shared their images. The report indicates that this "raises concerns that these agencies may share the deficiencies [they] identified at the four agencies [they] reviewed."

The State Auditor found that "ALPR systems should be accessible only to employees who need the data, and accounts should be promptly disabled otherwise. However, the agencies often neglected to limit ALPR system access and have allowed accounts that should be disabled to remain active longer than is prudent. To further ensure that individuals with access do not misuse the ALPR systems, the agencies should be auditing the license plate searches that users perform, along with conducting other monitoring activities. Instead, the agencies have conducted little to no auditing and monitoring and thus have no assurance that misuse has not occurred."

The State Auditor recommended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) draft and make available on its website a policy template that local law enforcement agencies can use as a model for their ALPR policies, and that DOJ develop and issue guidance to help local law enforcement agencies identify and evaluate the types of data they are currently storing in their ALPR systems. It also

suggested the Legislature set a requirement for when law enforcement agencies should delete ALPR data. The State Auditor recommended that the Legislature should establish a maximum data retention period for ALPR images.

In October of 2023, the DOJ released two information bulletins providing guidance to California state and local law enforcement agencies regarding the governance of ALPRs. According to the guidance, the DOJ believes California law prohibits ALPR information from being shared with federal agencies or local agencies outside of the state of California. The bulletin included a template use policy that recommended law enforcement agencies maintain the data for 60 days to six months.

Flock Safety, the ALPR company most prominently used in California, has a 30-day retention policy. The Los Angeles Police Department stores ALPR data for five years. After two years, a supervisor is required to access the data.

In 2025, the Governor vetoed SB 274 (Cervantes), which was similar to this bill. In that veto message, the Governor argued:

“This bill restricts the use and sharing of automated license plate reader (ALPR) data, including by placing a default 60-day limit on how long public entities may retain ALPR data.

“I appreciate the author's intent to prevent information regarding a person's whereabouts from falling into the wrong hands. Nevertheless, this measure does not strike the delicate balance between protecting individual privacy and ensuring public safety. For example, it may not be apparent, particularly with respect to cold cases, that license plate data is needed to solve a crime until after the 60-day retention period has elapsed. Conversely, restrictions on inter-agency data sharing may impair solving crimes in real time, such as highway shootings, where the suspect may be rapidly crossing jurisdictional boundaries. Further, by restricting law enforcement agencies' use of ALPR information only for locating persons or vehicles suspected of involvement in crimes, this bill would prevent the use of this information to locate missing persons.

“This bill also creates cost pressures, which are not accounted for in this year's budget, by requiring the Department of Justice to conduct random audits of public entities in order to ensure compliance with this bill. In partnership with the Legislature this year, my Administration has enacted a balanced budget that recognizes the challenging fiscal landscape our state faces while maintaining our commitment to working families and our most vulnerable communities. With significant fiscal pressures and the federal government's hostile economic policies, it is vital that we remain disciplined when considering bills with significant fiscal implications that are not included in the budget, such as this measure.”

Recent troubles with ALPRs. In August of 2025, a local news outlet in Colorado discovered that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had accessed ALPR data in Flock's database generated by customers who had not intended to share it with federal authorities.

In October of 2025, the University of Washington Center for Human Rights issued a report, *“Leaving the Door Wide Open: Flock surveillance Systems Expose Washington Data to Immigration Enforcement.* The report found that at least eight Washington State law enforcement agencies enabled direct, 1:1 sharing of their networks with the U.S. Border Patrol during 2025,

effectively opening the door to searches related to civil immigration enforcement activities. Flock audits also revealed a “back door” access by the U.S. Border Patrol to the networks of at least 10 Washington police departments which did not explicitly authorize Border Patrol searches of their network data. The report also found what they referred to as “side door” access, where law enforcement agencies in other states were accessing Flock data to help Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the state of Washington. The report indicated that in May of 2025 a police officer in Texas had conducted nationwide searches of Flock’s networks to track down a woman who had self-administered an abortion

A Ventura, California audit in 2026 of Flock Safety license plate readers found that the company had inadvertently shared Ventura County’s data with out-of-state law enforcement agencies, including federal agents. The audit found that out-of-state agencies accessed the Ventura County Sheriff’s Office’s data more than 364,000 times between February and March last year without the department’s approval or knowledge. Deputies said 299 justifications to enter the system referenced immigration enforcement. Ventura County disabled the “national lookup” feature in June 2023 to comply with state law barring local agencies from sharing data out-of-state, however several California law enforcement agencies reported the “national lookup” feature had been reactivated without any explanation. Flock has since removed California from the “national lookup” service. However, multiple California cities have since removed their Flock security cameras because of the data sharing in violation of California law. Flock Safety has since corrected the issue to ensure California law enforcement agencies cannot share their data outside of the state.

In October of 2025, Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a lawsuit against the City of El Cajon over its refusal to comply with state law by sharing data pulled from ALPRs with over 100 out-of-state law enforcement agencies. According to the DOJ, despite outreach from the department notifying the city of the violation, “the El Cajon Police Department and the City of El Cajon have refused to cease the unlawful practice of sharing ALPR data with out-of-state agencies. These include law enforcement agencies in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.

Transportation agencies, public transit operators, and others excluded. This bill specifically exempts red light cameras (criminal only), speed cameras, transit operator parking enforcement cameras, and airports under specific circumstances from the definition of “ALPR operator” and “ALPR end user.”

According to the author, “Currently, at least 230 police and sheriff departments in California use an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system, with at least three dozen more plan to use them in the future. Senate Bill 34 by Senate Hill in 2016 requires operators of these systems and those using ALPR data to implement policies to govern the usage of the data and provide safeguards to protect individual privacy. However, a 2020 report from the State Auditor confirmed that law enforcement agencies across the state are not complying with SB 34.

“ALPRs are a form of location surveillance, the data they collect can reveal our travel patterns and daily routines, the places we visit, and the people with whom we associate and love. Along with the threat to civil liberties, these data systems pose significant security risks. There have been multiple known breaches of ALPR data and technology in recent years, indicating potential

cybersecurity threats. In a climate where the current federal administration is pursuing mass deportations of U.S. citizens and undocumented individuals alike, Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) is a powerful surveillance technology that can invade the privacy of all individuals and violate the rights of entire communities.”

Oakland Privacy, *writing in support of this bill*, argues: “The Legislature has been hearing bills regarding strengthening automobile license plate reader enforcement oversight for many years now including a state audit in 2018, which concluded legislative action was needed to better protect the privacy of Californian residents, and bills from Senator Weiner, Assembly Speaker Pro Tempore Lowenthal, and in almost identical form last year, Senator Cervantes. That bill, SB 274, passed the Senate Judiciary committee 10-2, the Senate Public Safety committee 5-1 and the Senate Floor 28-6.

“In the last year, the news has only gotten worse. Automated License Plate Reader programs, as currently operated, directly threaten everything the State of California has done to protect access to reproductive care and gender treatment and to defend non-citizen residents from kidnapping, detention, deportation and rendition. Senate Bill 1013 seeks to close the leaks to immigration and return the program to its intended purpose of helping to locate stolen cars and identifying the perpetrators of criminal incidents.”

The California Police Chiefs Association, writing in opposition to this bill, argues “SB 1013’s requirement that all ALPR data be deleted after 30 days unless it is associated with a narrowly defined “hotlist” would severely limit the effectiveness of this technology. Many crimes are not reported immediately, particularly offenses such as sexual assault, domestic violence, human trafficking, and complex property crimes. In these situations, victims may come forward weeks or months after the incident, at which point ALPR data showing vehicles in the area becomes essential to identifying suspects or corroborating evidence. A rigid 30-day retention requirement would result in the permanent loss of that information before an investigation even begins.

“The bill’s reliance on “hotlists” as the primary justification for retaining data further compounds this problem. In most investigations, law enforcement does not initially know the identity of a suspect or the vehicle involved. Vehicles associated with criminal activity are often identified only after investigative leads are developed, meaning they would not appear on a hotlist within the limited 30-day window. As a result, SB 1013 would eliminate access to the very data that is most valuable in solving crimes where the suspect is unknown.

“While some agencies have adopted shorter retention policies, many of California’s largest law enforcement agencies, including those in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Sacramento, maintain retention periods well beyond 30 days because of the demonstrated investigative value of this data. Even among agencies with shorter retention periods, the requirement that data be retained only if it meets a narrow “hotlist” definition is a new and far more restrictive limitation that does not reflect current operational realities.”

The California Police Chiefs Association (CPCA) is seeking several amendments to the bill. They would like to mirror the LAPD retention policy for ALPR data (5-year retention, with a lock box on who can access the data after two years). CPCA believes this data retention is necessary to help them solve cold cases or cases where a new suspect has been determined and ALPR data could help confirm (or exonerate) a person’s location. They are also concerned about a provision of the bill that effectively would require them to delete evidence that was used during

an investigation to convict a person and are seeking amendments to retain the information if being used in an investigation and after conviction for appeals purposes. This bill requires law enforcement to follow best practices for ALPR data as outlined in a 2023 bulletin put out by DOJ. CPCA wants the language amended to accept any updates the DOJ may make to guidance ALPR policy. Finally, CPCA believes the restriction requiring a case number to complete a search of the ALPR database is too rigid and asks for amendments to also allow them to conduct a search using an incident number, or if neither is available, the reason why the search was conducted.

Committee comments. Under existing law, most law enforcement agencies can keep ALPR data indefinitely. The Legislature has been debating a shorter retention policy since 2019, with bills having retention policies as low as five days. Last year, the Governor vetoed a bill with a 60-day retention policy. If the desire is to have a retention policy that is not indefinite, the Legislature and the Administration will need to come to a compromise with law enforcement. An approach the Legislature may wish to be a default retention policy of 30 days that allows locals to have an extended retention policy if they make a public finding that they need to keep the data longer.

Last year the committee expressed concerns about the application of this bill to ALPRs used for automated enforcement or other transportation purposes because they already have their own data retention policies that are not applicable to ALPRs used for non-enforcement purposes. The author amended this bill to exempt transportation agencies. However, as drafted, the exemptions for ALPRs used for enforcement purposes are specifically called out by their enabling statutes. This can create an issue if a new automated enforcement system is adopted in the future. For example, last year the Legislature passed SB 720 (Ashby) Chapter 782, Statutes of 2025, which authorized red light cameras that issue civil violations instead of criminal violations. This bill, which uses the language from last year's SB 274, does not include an exception for the camera program created under SB 720. This year, the Legislature is considering two new camera programs: SB 1292 (Richardson) for parking enforcement, and SB 1279 (Gonzalez), another speed camera enforcement program. Both bills have their own retention policies, and neither bill is exempted from this bill.

Previous legislation. SB 274 (Cervantes) of 2025 would have prohibited a public agency from retaining ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list for more than 60 days after the date of collection. *This bill was vetoed by Governor Newsom.*

SB 34 (Hill) Chapter 532, Statutes of 2015 established regulations on the privacy and usage of ALPR data and expands the meaning of "personal information" to include information or data collected through the use or operation of an ALPR system.

AB 1463 (Lowenthal) of 2023 would have required operators and end-users of ALPR systems to conduct annual audits to review ALPR searches. If the operator or end-user is a public agency, it would have further required them to destroy all ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list within 30 days. AB 1463 would have placed restrictions on accessing certain systems and sharing ALPR information. *This bill died in the Assembly Transportation Committee.*

AB 2192 (Ramos) of 2022 would have authorized a public agency that uses an ALPR to share the data that they collect with a law enforcement agency of the federal government or another state if ALPR information is being sold, shared, or transferred to locate a vehicle or person

reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense, except as specified. *This bill was taken up in Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection for testimony only.*

SB 210 (Wiener) of 2021 would have provided greater transparency and accountability with respect to ALPR systems by requiring, similar hereto, ALPR operators and end-users to conduct annual audits to review ALPR searches. It would have further required an operator or end-user that is a public agency to destroy all ALPR data that does not match information on a hot list within 24 hours. *SB 210 died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.*

SB 1143 (Wiener) of 2020 was largely identical to AB 1463 and was held under submission in the Senate Transportation Committee.

AB 1782 (Chau) of 2019 would have required those operating ALPR systems and those accessing or using ALPR data to have policies that include procedures to ensure non-anonymized ALPR information is timely destroyed, except as specified, and that all ALPR information that is shared is anonymized. The bill was subsequently gutted and amended to address a different topic. *This bill died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.*

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

Oakland Privacy

Opposition

Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
City of Los Alamitos
City of Sonora
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC)
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association

Riverside County Sheriff's Office
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
Oppose Unless Amended

City of Kerman
City of Lomita
City of Oceanside
City of Rancho Palos Verdes
City of Vacaville
League of California Cities

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