

SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session

AB 883 (Lowenthal)
Version: June 17, 2026
Hearing Date: June 30, 2026
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
AM

SUBJECT

Data brokers: accessible deletion mechanism: deletion of personal information of
elected officials and judges

DIGEST

This bill requires the Secretary of State to notify any state elected official, a filing officer for a local government to notify any local elected official within the filing officer's jurisdiction, and the Judicial Council of California to notify any California judge, that they may submit a request to delete that person's personal information through the accessible deletion mechanism, as specified; and includes an enforcement mechanism, as provided.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Threats on public officials, including judges, are on the rise, causing legitimate fear and concern for the safety of themselves and their families. The recent events in Minnesota where elected politicians and their spouses were targeted in their homes and, in one instance, tragically killed, as well as the heartbreaking incident in 2020, in which the son of a federal judge in New Jersey was shot and killed when he answered the door to their home, provide a stark reminder that serving in public office poses risks for those who choose to serve and their families.¹

The bill was amended in the Senate Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection Committee resulting in most of the opposition's concerns being addressed and many moving to a neutral position. The bill is sponsored by Californians for Consumer Privacy and supported by the California Special Districts Association,

¹ Steven Karnowski, et. al, *The man suspected of shooting 2 Minnesota lawmakers is in custody after surrendering to the police*, AP News, (June 16, 2025), available at <https://apnews.com/article/minnesota-lawmakers-shot-8ce70a94c9eb90688baaa1a71faef6cc>; Meredith Deliso, ABC News, *Suspected gunman who killed Judge Esther Salas' son disparaged her as a Latina*, (Jul. 21, 2020), available at <https://abcnews.com/US/suspect-deadly-shooting-called-federal-judge-esther-salas/story?id=71901734>.

Public Citizen, the California Privacy Protection Agency , and California Initiative for Technology & Democracy and Public Citizen. The bill is opposed by ACLU Cal Action, Association of National Advertisers, and Consumer Data Industry Association. The Senate Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection Committee passed this bill on a vote of 9 to 0.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW

Existing law:

- 1) Provides that the home addresses, home telephone numbers, personal cellular telephone numbers, and birthdates of all employees of a public agency are not public records and are not open to public inspection. (Gov. Code § 7928.300(a).)
- 2) Prohibits a person from knowingly posting the home address or telephone number of any elected or appointed official, or of the official's residing spouse or child, on the internet knowing that person is an elected or appointed official and intending to cause imminent great bodily harm that is likely to occur or threatening to cause imminent great bodily harm to that individual, and provides that a violation is a misdemeanor, unless the violation leads to the bodily injury of the official, or their residing spouse or child, in which case the violation is a misdemeanor or a felony. (Gov. Code § 7928.210.)
- 3) Prohibits any person, business, or association from soliciting, selling, or trading on the internet the home address or telephone number of an elected or appointed official with the intent to cause imminent great bodily harm to the official or to any person residing at the official's home address. Authorizes an official whose home address or telephone number is solicited, sold, or traded in violation of this prohibition to bring an action in court and provides that they can get specified damages. (Gov. Code § 7928.230.)
- 4) Prohibits a state or local agency from publicly posting the home address, telephone number, or both the name and assessor parcel number of any elected or appointed official on the internet without first obtaining the written permission of that individual. (Gov. Code § 7928.205.)
- 5) Defines an "elected or appointed official" to include, but not be limited to, all of the following:
 - a) A state constitutional officer.
 - b) A Member of the Legislature.
 - c) An active or retired judge, court commissioner, or judge of the State Bar Court.
 - d) A district attorney.
 - e) A public defender.

- f) A member of a city council.
 - g) A member of a board of supervisors.
 - h) An appointee of the Governor.
 - i) An appointee of the Legislature.
 - j) A mayor.
 - k) A city attorney.
 - l) A police chief or sheriff.
 - m) A public safety official.
 - n) A state administrative law judge.
 - o) A federal judge or federal defender.
 - p) A member of the United States Congress or appointee of the President of the United States.
 - q) A judge of a federally recognized Indian tribe.
 - r) An appointee of a court to serve as children's counsel in a family or dependency proceeding. (Gov. Code § 7920.500.)
- 6) Establishes the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 (CPRA), which amends the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and creates the California Privacy Protection Agency (PPA), which is charged with implementing these privacy laws, promulgating regulations, and carrying out enforcement actions. (Civ. Code §§ 798.100 et seq.; Proposition 24 (2020).)
- 7) Provides consumers the right to request that a business delete any personal information about the consumer which the business has collected from the consumer. (Civ. Code § 1798.105(a).)
- 8) Provides that a business or service provider or contractor acting pursuant to its contract with the business, another service provider, or another contractor, shall not be required to comply with a consumer's request to delete the consumer's personal information if it is reasonably necessary for the business or service provider to maintain the consumer's personal information in order to do certain things, including to comply with a legal obligation. (Civ. Code § 1798.105(d).)
- 9) Grants a consumer the right to request that a business that collects personal information about the consumer disclose to the consumer the following:
 - a) the categories of personal information it has collected about that consumer;
 - b) the categories of sources from which the personal information is collected;
 - c) the business or commercial purpose for collecting or selling personal information;
 - d) the categories of third parties with whom the business shares personal information; and
 - e) the specific pieces of personal information it has collected about that consumer. (Civ. Code § 1798.110.)

- 10) Provides consumers the right to request that a business that sells the consumer's personal information, or that discloses it for a business purpose, disclose to the consumer the following:
 - a) the categories of personal information that the business collected about the consumer;
 - b) the categories of personal information that the business sold about the consumer and the categories of third parties to whom the personal information was sold, by category or categories of personal information for each third party to whom the personal information was sold; and
 - c) the categories of personal information that the business disclosed about the consumer for a business purpose. (Civ. Code § 1798.115.)
- 11) Provides a consumer the right, at any time, to direct a business that sells or shares personal information about the consumer to third parties not to sell or share the consumer's personal information. It requires such a business to provide notice to consumers, as specified, that this information may be sold or shared and that consumers have the right to opt out of the sale or sharing of their personal information. (Civ. Code § 1798.120.)
- 12) Provides that these provisions do not restrict a business' ability to collect, use, retain, sell, share, or disclose consumers' personal information that is deidentified or aggregate consumer information. (Civ. Code § 1798.145(a)(6).)
- 13) Defines "personal information" as information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household. The CCPA provides a nonexclusive series of categories of information deemed to be personal information, including biometric information, geolocation data, and "sensitive personal information." It does not include publicly available information or lawfully obtained, truthful information that is a matter of public concern. (Civ. Code § 1798.140(v).)
- 14) Extends additional protections to "sensitive personal information," which is defined as personal information that reveals particularly sensitive information such as genetic data and the processing of biometric information for the purpose of uniquely identifying a consumer. (Civ. Code § 1798.140(ae).)
- 15) Provides various exemptions from the obligations imposed by the CCPA, including where they would restrict a business' ability to comply with federal, state, or local laws. (Civ. Code § 1798.145.)

- 16) Requires a business, on or before January 31 following each year in which it meets the definition of a data broker, to register with the PPA, as provided. (Civ. Code § 1798.99.82.)
- 17) Defines “data broker” as a business that knowingly collects and sells to third parties the personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship, except as specified.
 - a) Aligns the definitions of “business,” “personal information,” “sale,” “collect,” “consumer,” and “third party” with those in the CCPA. (Civ. Code § 1798.99.80.)
- 18) Requires data brokers to provide to the PPA, and the PPA to include on its website, the name of the data broker and its primary physical address, email, and website. Data brokers may, at their discretion, also provide additional information concerning their data collection practices. (Civ. Code §§ 1798.99.82, 1798.99.84.)
- 19) Requires the PPA to establish an accessible deletion mechanism, as provided, that allows consumers, through a single request, to request all data brokers to delete any personal information related to the consumer, as specified. Data brokers are required to regularly access the mechanism and process requests for deletion, as specified. (Civ. Code § 1798.99.86.)
- 20) Provides that after a consumer has submitted a deletion request and a data broker has deleted the consumer’s data pursuant hereto, the data broker must delete all personal information of the consumer, except as provided, beginning August 1, 2026. After a consumer has submitted a deletion request and a data broker has deleted the consumer’s data, the data broker shall not sell or share new personal information of the consumer unless the consumer requests otherwise or the selling or sharing is otherwise permitted, as provided. (*Id.* at subd. (c)-(d).)
 - a) Requires data brokers to undergo audits every three years to determine compliance with the data broker registry law beginning January 1, 2028. (*Id.* at subd. (e).)

This bill:

- 1) Requires the Secretary of State to notify any state elected official that the elected official may submit a request to delete that person’s personal information through the accessible deletion mechanism, as specified.
- 2) Requires a filing officer for a local government to notify any local elected official within the filing officer’s jurisdiction that the elected official may submit a request to delete that person’s personal information through the accessible deletion mechanism, as specified.

- 3) Requires the Judicial Council of California to notify any California judge that the judge may submit a request delete that person's personal information through the accessible deletion mechanism, as specified.
- 4) Requires the PPA to create informational material detailing how state and local elected officials and judges can utilize the accessible deletion mechanism, as specified.
- 5) Requires a data broker to process a deletion request under these provisions pursuant to existing law.
- 6) Authorizes an elected official or judge who was notified pursuant to this section, or the Attorney General, a county counsel, or a city attorney on behalf of that elected official or judge, to bring a civil action against a data broker who does not delete personal information requested by a judge or an elected official for any of the following relief:
 - a) declaratory relief;
 - b) injunctive relief;
 - c) reasonable attorney's fees; and
 - d) actual damages.
- 7) Authorizes the court to award punitive damages in addition to any other relief if a court finds that a data broker willfully violated the deletion request of a judge or elected official.
- 8) Makes the provisions of 1) through 5), above, operative on July 1, 2027.
- 9) Requires a data broker to delete a consumer's data under the accessible deletion mechanism within 30 days of receiving the request and at least once every 30 days unless the consumer requests otherwise or the deletion is not required.

COMMENTS

1. Author comment

The author writes:

California is on the cutting edge when designing laws to protect the privacy of individuals in the State. Over the last 5 years there have been documented examples of harassment, threats and even violence against elected officials in California and beyond. It is imperative that we continue to update our laws to ensure that elected and appointed officials' personal information is protected in a manner that also protects the important principles of open government.

AB 883 makes various updates to the existing California Privacy Protection Agency to strengthen the ability for elected and appointed officials to protect their most personal information when they are faced with a credible threat. Providing these tools to elected and appointed officials will help them reduce the exposure of sensitive information about themselves and their families, ensuring their safety when it is most critical.

2. Intimidation and threats against elected officeholders and public officials is on the rise

A report published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point found that threats against public officials have steadily increased since 2017, which corresponds with an increase in polarization in this country since the 2016 presidential election.² The report found that in 2013-2016 there were an average of 38 federal charges per year, but that number almost doubled during 2017-2022. Several high profile incidents have occurred against federal officials. In 2017, U.S. Representative Steve Scalise was shot at a congressional baseball practice. There was the January 6 insurrection at the Capitol and the hammer attack on U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi's husband in their home. The California Legislature has also had its fair share of violent incidents. In late August of 2019, former Senator Richard Pan was shoved by an anti-vaccine activist who was videotaping Senator Pan while walking in downtown Sacramento.³

A little over a month ago, two Minnesota legislators – Senator John Hoffman and Representative Melissa Hortman – were shot in their homes. Senator Hoffman and his wife Yvette survived the attack, but were hospitalized for needed medical care. Representative Hortman and her husband Mark succumbed to their injuries. The suspect was apprehended and faces federal and state murder charges. Minnesota Governor Tim Walz called the shooting an “act of targeted political violence.”⁴ Court documents in the case show that the suspect used “online people search services to find the home addresses of his intended targets. Police found the names of 11 registered data brokers – or companies that gather and sell people’s information, including addresses, emails and phone numbers – in [the suspect’s] abandoned car after the shootings. Police also found a list of dozens of state and federal lawmakers, and their addresses, according to the criminal complaint.”⁵ On the last night of the 2019 legislative session,

² Pete Simi, et. al, *Rising Threats to Public Officials: A Review of 10 Years of Federal Data*, Vol. 17, Issue 5, (May 2024), available at <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/rising-threats-to-public-officials-a-review-of-10-years-of-federal-data/>.

³ KCRA Staff, *'I don't regret pushing him': Man cited for shoving California state senator*, KCRA News, (Aug. 22, 2019), available at <https://www.kcra.com/article/california-state-senator-richard-pan-assault/28777200>.

⁴ Meg Anderson & Avie Schneider, *Suspect named in targeted shootings of Minnesota lawmakers*, NPR, (Jun. 14, 2025), available at <https://www.npr.org/2025/06/14/nx-s1-5433645/minnesota-state-legislators-lawmaker-shootings>.

⁵ Alfred Ng, *Alleged shooter found Minnesota lawmakers' addresses online, court docs say*, Politico, (Jun. 16, 2025), available at <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/06/16/alleged-shooter-found-minnesota-lawmakers-addresses-online-court-docs-say-00409260>.

the Senate had to shut down for several hours after a protestor in the Senate Gallery “threw a feminine hygiene device containing what appeared to be blood onto the Senate floor.”⁶

A 2024 report from the Brennan Center for Justice that conducted surveys in October 2023 from over 1,700 local and state elected officials from all 50 states and across ages, party affiliations, ideologies, genders, sexual orientations, racial and ethnic identities, and religions found alarming rates of threats against elected officials. The report highlights:

Officeholders across these demographic categories reported experiencing threats or attacks within the past three years. And the volume and severity of abuse have increased in recent years, they said. More than 40 percent of state legislators experienced threats or attacks within the past three years, and more than 18 percent of local officeholders experienced threats or attacks within the past year and a half. The numbers balloon to 89 percent of state legislators and 52 percent of local officeholders when less severe forms of abuse — insults or harassment such as stalking — are included.⁷

A report conducted by the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego that focused on local elected officials in San Diego, Riverside, and Imperial Counties found:

- 66% of all elected officials reported being on the receiving end of threats and harassment.
- 69% of women report experiencing threats and harassment monthly, compared to 38% of their male counterparts.
- 83% of respondents said that threats and harassment are a major issue that require a public response.
- 46% of women and 39% of men have considered leaving public service as a direct result of the threats and harassment they have experienced.⁸

As the Brennan Center for Justice Report explains, “threats and attacks [on elected officials] constrain how freely officeholders interact with constituents, narrow the spectrum of policy positions they feel safe to support, and make them less willing to

⁶ Angela Hart & Colby Bermel, *Protester throws apparent blood at legislators, shutting down California Senate*, Politico, (Sept. 13, 2019), available at <https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2019/09/13/protester-throws-red-liquid-at-legislators-shutting-down-california-senate-1188537>.

⁷ *Intimidation of State and Local Officeholders*, Brennan Center for Justice, (Jan. 25, 2024), available at <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/intimidation-state-and-local-officeholders>.

⁸ *Assessing Threats and Harassment Towards Locally Elected Officials*, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, available at <https://www.sandiego.edu/peace/institute-for-peace-justice/violence-inequality-power-lab/san-diego-threats.php>.

continue in public service. Unaddressed, the problem stands to endanger not just individual politicians but, more broadly, the free and fair functioning of representative democracy — at every level of government.”⁹

From 2020 to 2025, at least 310 threats against bench officers were reported to the California Highway Patrol Threat Assessment Center. The California Highway Patrol is charged with security of California’s judicial officers through its Judicial Protection Section. As of March 2026, the year-to-date total is 20 threats. The New York Times reported that they had identified “thousands of threats targeting state judges in the past three years alone, among more than 14,000 broader security incidents involving state courts and their employees across the country.”¹⁰ Noting that these figures “offer a look at a problem that has historically gone uncounted because of a lack of record-keeping; they almost certainly understate the true scale, given that many states fail to formally track the issue.”¹¹

3. This bill seeks to provide enhanced protection for elected officials and judges

This bill requires the Secretary of State to notify any state elected official, a filing officer for a local government to notify any local elected official within the filing officer’s jurisdiction, and the Judicial Council of California to notify any California judge, that they may submit a request to delete that person’s personal information through the accessible deletion mechanism, as specified. The PPA is required to create informational material detailing how state and local elected officials and judges can utilize the accessible deletion mechanism. The bill includes an enforcement mechanism that was similar to the one in AB 302 (Bauer-Kahan, 2025) that passed this Committee on a vote of 11 to 0, before it was subsequently amended to address a subject outside of this Committee’s jurisdiction. The enforcement mechanism allows an elected official or judge who was notified under these provisions, or the Attorney General, a county counsel, or a city attorney on behalf of such an elected official or judge, to bring a civil action against a data broker who does not delete the requested information for any of the following relief: declaratory relief; injunctive relief; reasonable attorney’s fees; and actual damages. A court is authorized to award punitive damages in addition to any other relief if a court finds that a data broker willfully violated the deletion request. Under the bill, these provisions become operative on July 1, 2027.

4. Stakeholder statements

Californians for Consumer Privacy, the sponsor of the bill, write in support stating:

⁹ *Intimidation of State and Local Officeholders*, Brennan Center for Justice, (Jan, 25, 2024), available at <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/intimidation-state-and-local-officeholders>.

¹⁰ Katie J.M. Baker, *State Judges Turn to Guns in New Era of Judicial Threats* (April 10, 2026), New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/10/us/state-judges-threats.html>.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Elected officials and judges have increasingly experienced threats of violence to themselves and their families. These threats are not theoretical. In 2020 Daniel Anderl was murdered when someone went to his home to confront his mother, a US District Court judge. This horrendous act of violence led to Daniel's Law in New Jersey, which limits access to key information in order to protect judges and others in law enforcement. In 2025, Minnesota elected officials and their families were attacked, and state Representative Hortman and her husband were assassinated, while state Senator Hoffman and his wife were shot and seriously injured by a gunman. In addition to these horrific incidents, research from the University of San Diego analyzed experiences of elected officials in San Diego, Riverside and Imperial Counties and found that 66% of elected officials found themselves being on the receiving end of threats and harassment.

Elected officials and judges are committed public servants who should be able to serve free of threats and harassment to them and their families. Dangers experienced by these officials and their families creates situations where our best and brightest are less likely to serve because of the potential for harm. That outcome is bad for our state and nation. [...]

ACLU Cal Action wrote in opposition to a prior version of the bill. The bill was amended in the Senate Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection Committee and these amendments seem to address the concerns of ACLU Cal Action, though an official change in position was not received by the Committee.

The Consumer Data Industry Association writes in opposition:

AB 883 authorizes an elected official, judge, or the Attorney General, county counsel, or city attorney acting on that individual's behalf, to bring a civil action against a data broker for alleged violations of the DELETE Act. Available remedies include declaratory relief, injunctive relief, actual damages, attorney's fees, and punitive damages for willful violations.

California already has a comprehensive enforcement framework governing data brokers. The California Privacy Protection Agency is charged with administering the DELETE Act and enforcing compliance with its requirements. Creating an additional private enforcement mechanism for a limited class of individuals invites duplicative litigation over obligations that are already subject to regulatory oversight.

Further, AB 883 also shortens the DELETE Act compliance timeline from 45 days to 30 days by requiring registered data brokers to access the deletion mechanism, process deletion requests, process unverifiable requests as opt-out requests, and complete recurring deletions every 30 days instead of every 45 days. The original timeline was established during debate on the DELETE Act to ensure that compliance was consistent with the CPRA.

SUPPORT

Californians for Consumer Privacy (sponsor)
California Initiative for Technology & Democracy
California Privacy Protection Agency
California Special Districts Association
Public Citizen

OPPOSITION

ACLU California Action
Association of National Advertisers
Consumer Data Industry Association

RELATED LEGISLATION

Pending Legislation: AB 302 (Bauer-Kahan, 2025-26) would have required the PPA to upload an elected official's or a judge's information into the accessible deletion mechanism, as specified. AB 302 was subsequently amended to address a completely different topic.

Prior Legislation:

AB 1785 (Pacheco, Ch. 551, Stats. 2024) prohibited a state or local agency from publicly posting, as defined, the home address, telephone number, or both the name and assessor parcel number associated with the home address of any elected or appointed official on the internet without first obtaining the written permission of that individual.

SB 362 (Becker, Ch. 709, Stats. 2023), among other things, required the PPA to establish an accessible deletion mechanism, as provided, that allows consumers, through a single request, to request all data brokers to delete any personal information related to the consumer, as specified.

AB 1202 (Chau, Ch. 753, Stats. 2019) established California's data broker registry.

PRIOR VOTES

Senate Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 9,
Noes 0)

Assembly Floor (Ayes 75, Noes 0)

Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 15, Noes 0)

Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 14, Noes 0)
