
THIRD READING

Bill No: AB 825
Author: Petrie-Norris (D), Becker (D) and Rivas (D)
Amended: 9/10/25 in Senate
Vote: 21

PRIOR SENATE VOTES NOT RELEVANT

SENATE ENERGY, U. & C. COMMITTEE: 12-0, 9/11/25

AYES: Becker, Ochoa Bogh, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Caballero, Dahle,
Gonzalez, Limón, McNerney, Stern, Strickland

NO VOTE RECORDED: Allen, Grove, Hurtado, Rubio, Wahab

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 57-5, 6/5/25 - See last page for vote

SUBJECT: Independent System Operator: independent regional organization

SOURCE: California State Association of Electrical Workers
Coalition of California Utility Employees
Environmental Defense Fund
Natural Resources Defense Council

DIGEST: This bill authorizes the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the electrical corporations whose transmission is operated by the CAISO to use voluntary energy markets governed by an independent regional organization (RO) if specified requirements are met.

Senate Floor Amendments delete the contents of this bill related to electric transmission public financing/ownership and electricity utility affordability proposals, and replace with the language related to the independent RO for energy markets.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

- 1) Establishes that U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction over the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. Establishes that FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over sales of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce by public utilities, i.e., the rates, terms, and conditions of wholesale electric sales by public utilities. (Federal Power Act §§201, 205, 206 (16 USC 824, 824d, 824e))
- 2) Establishes and vests the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations. (Article XII of the California Constitution)
- 3) Establishes the CAISO governing board with five members appointed for three-year terms by the Governor and subject to confirmation by the Senate. Requires the CAISO to ensure efficient use and reliable operation of the transmission grid consistent with achievement of planning and operating reserve criteria no less stringent than those established by the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). The CAISO also operates a real-time market, Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM), and is in the process of launching a day-ahead energy market, the Extended Day-Ahead Market (EDAM). (Public Utilities Code §§337 and 345)
- 4) Requires the CAISO, as a nonprofit, public benefit corporation, to conduct its operations consistent with applicable state and federal laws and consistent with the interests of the people of the state. Requires the CAISO to manage the transmission grid and related energy markets in a manner that is consistent with: making the most efficient use of available energy resources, reducing overall economic cost to the state's consumers, applicable state law to protect the public's health and the environment, among others. Requires the CAISO to consult with state and local agencies to ensure it is operating in furtherance of state law regarding consumer and environmental protection. (Public Utilities Code §345.5)
- 5) Expresses the intent of the Legislature that the CAISO transform into a RO to promote the development of regional electricity transmission markets in the western states and to improve the access of consumers served by CAISO to those markets, only when such transformation is in the best interest of California ratepayers. Requires the transformation of the CAISO into a RO,

with the approval of the Legislature, pursuant to a specified process. (Public Utilities Code §359.5)

- 6) Establishes the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) which requires the CPUC to require all retail sellers to procure a minimum quantity of electricity products from eligible renewable energy resources as a specified percentage of total kilowatt hours sold to their customers (60% by 2030) and specifies portfolio content categories that must be satisfied for each compliance period with an increasing majority from renewable energy resources that have a first point of interconnection with a California balancing authority (BA) – this is known as “bucket 1” resources. (Public Utilities Code §§399.15 and 399.16)
- 7) Establishes the policy of the state that eligible renewable energy resources and zero-carbon resources supply 100% of all retail sales of electricity to California end-use customers by December 31, 2045. Requires the CPUC and California Energy Commission (CEC), in consultation with California Air Resources Board (CARB), to take steps to ensure that a transition to a zero-carbon electric system for the state does not cause or contribute to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions increases elsewhere in the western grid. (Public Utilities Code §454.53)

This bill:

- 1) Authorizes the CAISO and the electrical corporations that are participating transmission owners whose transmission systems are operated by the CAISO, to use voluntary energy markets governed by an independent RO, only if specified requirements are satisfied, notwithstanding the requirements in law for the CAISO to manage related energy markets conducting its operations consistent with applicable state and federal laws and consistent with the interests of the people of the state.
- 2) Authorizes the CAISO, on or after January 1, 2028, to implement tariff modifications accepted by the FERC to operate the energy markets whose rules are governed by an independent RO if the governing board of the CAISO has adopted a resolution finding that each of the specified requirements have been, or will be, adopted by the independent RO.
- 3) Requires the CPUC to make a determination through a formal decision in an existing or new proceeding that the requirements above have been satisfied before electrical corporations participate in an energy market governed by an independent RO.

- 4) Provides that the authorization provided to the CAISO and electrical corporations to participate in an independent RO and the related requirements do not diminish the CPUC's authority to direct an electrical corporation to withdraw from an energy market governed by an independent RO.
- 5) Requires the CAISO to maintain the necessary technical capability to operate energy markets in a manner that enables electrical corporations, local publicly owned electric utilities (POUs), and other market participants to withdraw from the markets governed by the independent RO and instead the CAISO would provide separate market services for those entities.
- 6) Requires, beginning one year after the implementation of the independent RO's markets, and annually thereafter, the CAISO, in consultation with the independent RO, to report to the CPUC, CEC, and the legislative committees with primary jurisdiction over electrical corporations. Requires the CPUC and CEC to review each report required and to publicly post an acknowledgement to their internet websites.
- 7) Requires the chair of the board of governors and the chief executive officer of the CAISO to annually appear before the appropriate policy committees of the Legislature to present the annual report required by this bill.
- 8) Requires the CAISO, on or before December 31, 2026, to conduct and complete a study of the impacts of implementing the use of voluntary energy markets governed by an independent RO on the retention and creation of jobs in California, including impacts on jobs constructing and maintaining powerplants in California.
- 9) Requires the CAISO to continue its functions and responsibilities as a BA as they existed before enactment of this bill. Prohibits the CAISO from changing its BAA from what existed on December 31, 2024, except under specified conditions, including combining with other California BAs.
- 10) Explicitly states that except for managing energy markets, this bill does not change the responsibilities of the CAISO in statute, including managing the transmission grid, planning for transmission expansion, reliability, and resource adequacy.
- 11) Explicitly states the independent RO is not a California BA, and the geographic footprint of the independent RO is not a BAA.
- 12) Repeals Article 4 (related to defunct Power Exchange), Article 5 (concerning intention for a regional compact), and Article 5.5 (intent for the transformation

of the CAISO to a regional organization) from the Public Utilities Code, along with Section 352 (prohibit the CAISO from entering into a multistate entity or regional organization) and subdivision (f) of Section 337 (related to Section 352 becoming operative).

Background

Efforts to expand CAISO operations across the West. After multiple unsuccessful Legislative efforts to regionalize the regional transmission operations (RTO) authority of the CAISO, including making the governance independent from California authority, in July 2023, a group of regulators, including CPUC President Reynolds and CEC Vice Chair Gunda, along with regulators from Arizona, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington called for a viable path to electricity market inclusive of all Western states, including California, with independent governance. The regulators expressed a common commitment in seeking the benefits of an expanded regional energy market and encouraged stakeholders to participate in the effort and shape the approach.

About the Pathways Initiative. In the roughly year and a half since the effort was initiated by the regulators' letter, a stakeholder driven process has culminated in broad support among diverse parties – including environmental, labor, local electric POUs, community choice aggregators, and others – for what is referred to as the West-Wide Governance Pathways Initiative (Pathways Initiative). The Pathways Initiative is an effort led by a group of stakeholders from the eleven Western states in the Western Interconnection (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming) with the goal of creating a new entity with independent governance capable of offering an expansive suite of West-Wide, voluntary wholesale electricity market functions across the largest possible footprint. Unlike previous attempts which sought to authorize the expansion of the main electric grid and all the functions operated by the CAISO (including making its governance independent of California authority) as an RTO, the Pathways Initiative has proposed an expansion and independence of the energy market functions of the CAISO, preserving the other functions (including transmission, reliability, BA, etc.). Specifically, the Pathways Initiative has proposed the development of a new independent RO to oversee the energy markets functions of the CAISO.

Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). California's RPS requires all retail sellers to procure a minimum quantity of electricity products from eligible renewable energy resources. The RPS currently calls for 52% of total retail electricity sales in California to be met from eligible renewables by December 31, 2027, and 60% by

December 31, 2030. The RPS statute also requires a percentage of those targets that must be met with specific portfolio content categories, these are commonly referred to as “RPS buckets.” There are three categories of RPS buckets (each with varying requirements of their procurement, with preference for Category 1, then Category 2, and lastly Category 3).

Comments

Need for this bill. The supporters of this bill intend for it to reflect the vision for the Pathways Initiative Step 2 proposal by authorizing the CAISO, and the electrical corporations for whom the CAISO operates transmission (notably, Pacific Gas & Electric, San Diego Gas & Electric, and Southern California), to use voluntary regional energy markets governed by an independent RO, if specified requirements are met. The authorization would support the efforts by the supporters of the Pathways Initiative to expand energy markets across the West by attracting more participation from other states who are currently reluctant to join in markets governed by a CAISO governing board appointed by the California Governor and confirmed the State Senate. They note the changing energy landscape and need for a larger footprint to provide market efficiencies and electric grid optimization, including support for advancing clean energy.

Differences between this effort and previous legislative proposals. As noted above, previous legislative efforts attempted to transform the CAISO into a regional RTO independent of California governance (appointment by the Governor and confirmation by the Senate) with the notion to transfer all of the CAISO’s functions – BA, transmission planning and operations, transmission cost allocation, reliability coordination, energy market operations and rules. Instead, the proponents of this bill contend this bill seeks to only transform the functions related to energy market rules to be overseen by an independent RO, instead of the CAISO (though CAISO would serve as a vendor to the independent RO to manage daily functions of the energy markets). The supporters of this bill argue that it is a more incremental approach to the previous legislative efforts and one that is more protective of California’s clean energy policies, particularly as it retains the BA functions. Additionally, the supporters suggest an independent RO for energy markets – especially as EDAM is scheduled to launch next year – will enable additional participation from entities who are wary of participating in a market whose governance is overseen by California. They assert the expansion of the energy markets enabled by the independent RO will provide greater opportunity to reduce costs for electric utility customers, optimize clean energy resources, provide system efficiencies, and improved electric reliability.

Supporters raise concerns about competing efforts in the West. The supporters of this bill argue that expansion of energy markets in the West will happen, as other competing efforts are taking shape, specifically the efforts by Arkansas-based Southwest Power Pool (SPP), a RTO in the Eastern Interconnection, to develop Markets+ energy day-ahead market in the Western Interconnection. Markets+ has been approved by the FERC and as of May of this year, Bonneville Power Administration, a federal agency that markets and transmits electricity from federal hydroelectric dams in the northwest of the U.S., has stated its intent to join SPP's day-ahead market. However, a group of environmental and consumer organizations have filed a lawsuit against BPA's decision to join SPP's Markets+ on procedural, environmental, and reliability concerns about BPA joining a noncontiguous day-ahead market instead of the CAISO's market. Many express concerns that a Markets+ day-ahead market will also erode participation in the CAISO's WEIM, in addition to opportunities for EDAM expansion.

Studies on impacts, show promise and need for some caution. Various studies have been presented or released to help better quantify the potential impacts of a broader energy market footprint on consumer cost/savings, electricity reliability, and emissions. Previous studies examined the benefits of the expansion of the CAISO BA functions across a broader Western footprint, more recent studies have sought to quantify the impacts of expanded energy markets. The CEC commissioned the study by the Brattle Group who examined the impacts of expanded participation in the West in CAISO's EDAM. In general, the study notes that benefits vary depending on the size and diversity of the members that join, with a greater potential for benefits from a larger and more diverse footprint. The study found a fully expanded EDAM could produce \$1 billion in annual benefits to Californians, significantly higher than a split market scenario. The preliminary study also found the expanded EDAM provides a greater reduction in natural gas generation (31% reduction) within California and overall reduced emissions, as compared to a split market scenario which would reduce emissions in state but increase emissions within the broader footprint. A separate study by Professor Michael Wara and researchers at Stanford University's Woods Institute on the Environment examined electricity reliability benefits of broader regional cooperation under extreme events. The study found that in the worst-case stress event, the benefits of operating in a single West-wide electricity market are greater as compared to those of a split West-wide market. Specifically, the study notes the larger footprints for a single ISO/RTO create larger reliability benefits during extreme events.

Concerns about risks of undermining state's clean energy policies. Efforts to regionalize the CAISO have long raised concerns that such expansions could undermine the state's clean energy policies, especially the RPS and its preference for Category 1 eligible renewable energy resources. Previous efforts to regionalize the CAISO raised concerns that opening up the operation of CAISO would expose state policies and programs to federal preemption or Dormant Commerce Clause claims. Those concerned largely express trepidation that the broader footprint within an independent and expanded market could result in challenges to California's RPS, and eliminate the ability to require that power be delivered to a California BA (if that BA is now the entire Western U.S.) or that California utilities could be forced to prop up coal plants whether as part of an RTO-run capacity market or from challenges to state policies for renewable energy and zero-carbon resources by other market participants, or interference in the market by FERC under the orders of the White House. The supporters of this bill attempt to address these concerns by (1) limiting the expansion of the independent RO to only the market rules, (2) preserving all other functions with CAISO; and (3) including language in this bill that makes explicit that this bill does not change any requirement related to the RPS or the SB 100 policy of the state to reach specified zero-carbon and renewable energy goals. They also argue that the CAISO is today subject to FERC oversight with or without this proposal. The Utility Reform Network (TURN) expresses concerns that many of the guardrails added in SB 540 are not included in AB 825, including the requirements prohibiting the independent RO from establishing mandatory resource adequacy and reliability, nor rely on a centralized capacity market or separate market for renewable, firm, and variable resources. TURN argues those protections, and others, are necessary given the Trump administration's intents to intervene in wholesale energy markets to favor coal and gas generation, and marginalize renewable energy resources.

Bill attempts to provide guardrails. As written, this bill would require the CAISO to ensure the independent RO satisfies a number of requirements including the governing board maintains a public policy governing board committee that engages with states, maintains relationships and seek input from a body of state regulators, maintain an office of public participation, maintains access to independent market analysis, market data is available to the CEC, market rules continue to provide GHG emissions information and protocols, and provides a procedure for unilateral withdrawal by any participant. These guardrails are intended to make clear the protections for Californians. However, many of opponents to this bill argue that the guardrails are not sufficient to overcome the control of the Delaware-based corporation, as intended by the Pathways Initiative for the independent RO, that will have full authority to set the rules. The need for

guardrails is warranted, especially given the actions by President Trump, as he has already espoused interfering in independent agencies, such as FERC (and as evidenced by the President's efforts to remove members of the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Trade Commission), his vocal support for coal generation, his opposition to renewable energy, and issuance of an executive orders, including one directing the U.S. Attorney General to identify state and local laws that may be unconstitutional or preempted by federal law, citing those addressing climate change in California.

Opportunities to withdraw from the independent RO. This bill makes explicit that the CPUC's authority to direct electric IOUs to withdraw from an energy market governed by an independent RO. Additionally, this bill includes, among the list of 13 requirements that must be satisfied before the CAISO may use the voluntary independent RO, that the governing document of the independent RO includes a procedure for unilateral withdrawal by any participant. The supporters of this bill include these provisions to ensure the state and utilities can exit the independent RO should conditions warrant. Many of the opponents to this bill express concerns that the language is not strong enough to protect the state from the need to withdraw, including the risk of unknown penalties that may be assessed against the state or its utilities and other electricity providers. TURN raises concerns that the language in this bill would limit the CPUC's authority to withdrawal determinations to only the electrical corporations (but not other market participants, including CCAs), and to circumstances where its authority is threatened which "may not include federal government actions to weaponize energy markets against California."

Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 345.5 of the Public Utilities Code. Under Section 345.5 of the Public Utilities Code, the CAISO is required to conduct its operation consistent with applicable state and federal laws and consistent with the interests of the people of the state. Many of the opponents of SB 540 (Becker, 2025) had expressed concerns with the previous use of "in lieu" in reference to the authority granted to the CAISO to use voluntary energy markets governed by the independent RO. They argued the language should continue to stipulate "consistent with" in order to ensure the operations of the independent RO remain protective and in the interests of Californians. The language in AB 825 states "notwithstanding," presumably many of the same concerns raised by those opposed to "in lieu" of language would also oppose the notwithstanding in this bill. Several organizations opposed to the bill, including Environmental Working Group, Consumer Watchdog, Public Citizen and others express concerns that the elimination of subdivision (b) of Section 345.5 of the Public Utilities Code opens

the door to price gouging by removing the requirements to maximize supply and minimize costs instituted after the 2000-01 electricity crisis partly affected by market manipulation by Enron. They contend amendments to SB 540 retained this protection, “but sponsors [of the bill] say they cannot live with the requirement. Why? Because the point of a regional market is for sellers to be free to charge the highest price they can squeeze out of ratepayers.”

Timing and the role of the Legislature. This bill’s conditions changes to the CAISO governance of energy markets on the governance documents of the independent RO and a vote by the CAISO GB. Many of the opponents of SB 540 urged the requirement of a concurrent resolution prior to authorizing the CAISO to use the voluntary markets of the independent RO. Previous legislative efforts to modify the governance structure of the CAISO to a regionalized RTO, included in SB 350 (De León and Leno, Chapter 547, Statutes of 2015), conditioned implementation on several actions, including enactment of subsequent statute. The opponents argue that such a requirement would ensure that the Legislature will have greater clarity as to the complex issues and potential implications. The stakeholders involved in the Pathways Initiative have worked very quickly and impressively to develop their proposals with consensus among diverse entities for the new independent RO. However, much work remains to identify the aspects of the market rules that would be handled by the new RO and market operations that the CAISO would continue to handle, including whether FERC will approve them. Pursuant to amendments from the Senate Appropriations Committee, SB 540 included oversight actions by a Regional Energy Markets Oversight Council (REMOC) who was tasked with reviewing and authorization participation in the independent RO by all California participants. However, many of the original supporters of SB 540 opposed this addition and called on its removal. This bill does not include the REMOC, instead it requires the CPUC to make a determination in a proceeding that the requirements of this bill on the independent RO are satisfied before electrical corporations participate in an energy market governed by the independent RO. This bill also requires an annual report and presentation before the relevant legislative policy committees on the developments of the independent RO. Many of the opponents of this bill believe this oversight is not sufficient to protect the state’s and its consumers’ interests, particularly given the continued actions of the Trump administration against renewable energy, California’s policies, and interference in independent agencies.

Related/Prior Legislation

SB 540 (Becker) of 2025, similar language to this bill, with some key differences, including a REMCO which would be responsible for ensuring the participation in regional markets serves the interests of the state. The bill is pending in the Assembly Utilities & Energy Committee.

(See policy committee analysis for more.)

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes

According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

- Unknown one-time costs, likely in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars (ratepayer funds), for the CPUC to conduct a proceeding in order to determine whether certain requirements have been satisfied before electrical corporations are able to participate in an energy market governed by an independent RO.
- Unknown, potentially significant ongoing costs (ratepayer funds) for the CPUC and CEC to review required reports and to coordinate and revise rules, regulations, and guidance related to the Regional Portfolio Standard (RPS) program.
- To the extent that this bill impacts electricity rates, it could result in unknown but potentially significant costs or savings to the state as a an electric utility ratepayer. The State of California is an electricity customer, purchasing roughly one percent of the state's electricity. As such, the state incurs costs when rates increase, and realizes cost savings if rates go down. (General Fund and various special funds)
- To the extent that this bill results in a lower amount of reduced emissions related to California's emission reduction targets than the amount that otherwise would have occurred, it could result in cost pressures of an unknown but potentially significant amount (various funds) to find and fund equivalent emissions reductions from other sources in order to ensure the same progress toward meeting state climate goals.

SUPPORT: (Verified 9/12/25)

California State Association of Electrical Workers (Co-source)
Coalition of California Utility Employees (Co-source)

Environmental Defense Fund (Co-source)
Natural Resources Defense Council (Co-source)
350 Humboldt
350 Sacramento
Advanced Energy United
Akamai Technologies
Amazon
American Clean Power- California
Balancing Authority of Northern California
California Chamber of Commerce
California Choice Energy Authority
California Coalition of Large Energy Users
California Community Choice Association
California Environmental Voters
California Large Energy Consumers Association
California Manufacturers & Technology Association
California Municipal Utilities Association
California Outdoor Recreation Partnership
Central Coast Community Energy
Ceres
Clean Energy Alliance
Clean Energy Buyers Association
Clean Power Alliance
Climate Action California
Climate Hawks Vote
Data Center Coalition
E2
EDF Power Solutions
EDP Renewables North America LLC
Elevate California
Enel North America, Inc.
Google
Independent Energy Producers Association
Leap
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
Marin Clean Energy
Microsoft Corporation
Netflix
Northern California Power Agency
Orange County Power Authority

Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Pacific Power
Pattern Energy
Peninsula Clean Energy
Pioneer Community Energy
Portland General Electric
Public Advocates Office
Rivian
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
San Diego Community Power
San Diego Gas & Electric
Sierra Club California
Sierra Nevada Brewing
Silicon Valley Clean Energy
Silicon Valley Leadership Group
Solar Energy Industries Association
Southern California Edison
Switchboard
TechNet
The Climate Reality Project - Silicon Valley Chapter
The Nature Conservancy
Union of Concerned Scientists
Western Freedom Energy Action
Western Power Trading Forum
Western Resource Advocates

OPPOSITION: (Verified 9/12/25)

350s: Conejo/San Fernando Valley, Contra Costa Action, Long Beach, San Diego,
SoCal, South Bay LA, Southland Legislative Alliance, and Ventura County
Climate HubRob Haw
Ballona Wetlands Institute
Ban SUP
Cal Poly Initiative for Climate Leadership and Resilience
California Alliance for Community Energy
California Climate Voters
California Environmental Justice Alliance
Californians for Energy Choice
Californians for Green Nuclear Power
Center for Biological Diversity
Change Begins With ME

Chino Valley Democratic Club
Clean Coalition
Coastal Lands Action Network
Consumer Watchdog
Contra Costa MoveOn
Courageous Resistance
Defend Ballona Wetlands
Democrats for Neighborhood Action
El Dorado Progressives
Electric Vehicle Association CA Central Coast Chapter
Environmental and Political Action Alerts
Environmental Working Group
Extinction Rebellion SF Bay Area
Feminists in Action Los Angeles
Fission Transition
Food and Water Watch
Fresnans Against Fracking
Glendale Environmental Coalition
Green Party of California
Haight Ashbury Neighborhood Council
Hammond Climate Solutions Foundation
Indivisibles: 36, 41, Alta-Pasadena, Auburn, Beach Cities, CA 25 Simi Valley-
Porter Ranch, CA 43, CA 45, CA Green Team, Claremont/Inland Valley,
Colusa County, East Bay, East Valley, Eden, Elmwood, El Dorado Hills,
Euclid, Fremont, Hillcrest, Los Angeles, Manteca, Marin, Media City
Burbank, Lakewood, Livermore, Mendocino, Mid-Peninsula, Monterey,
Normal Heights, OC 46, OC 48, Of the Desert, Orchard City, Palo9 Alto
Plus, Petaluma, Redlands, ReSisters Walnut Creek, Ross Valley, Sacramento,
San Diego Central, San Jose, San Pedro, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz County,
Sausalito, Sebastopol, SF, SF Peninsula and CA 14, SFV, Sonoma County,
South Bay LA, Stanislaus, Stockton, Tracy, Tri Valley, TWW/Los Gatos,
Ventura, Westside LA, Yalla, and Yolo
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Western States Section
International Brotherhood of Ironworkers
Local Clean Energy Alliance
Long Beach Alliance for Clean Energy
Long Beach Environmental Alliance
Mill Valley Community Action Network
Napa Climate Now
Our City San Francisco

Our Revolution Long Beach
Physicians for Social Responsibility, SF Bay Chapter
Progressive Democrats of America
Progressive Democrats of California
Progressive Democrats of the Santa Monica Mountains
Public Citizen
Queers 4 Climate
Reclaim Our Power
Récolte Energy
Rooted in Resistance
San Joaquin Valley Democratic Club
Santa Cruz Climate Action Network
Santa Cruz for Bernie
Santa Monica Dem Club
Sequoia ForestKeeper
SLO Climate Coalition
SoCal Americans for Democratic Action
Sunflower Alliance
Sustainable Systems Research Foundations, Santa Cruz
The Climate Alliance of Santa Cruz County
The Protect Our Communities Foundation
The Resistance Northridge
The Utility Reform Network
Together We Will Contra Costa
Urban Ecology Project
Valley Women's Club of San Lorenzo Valley
Venice Resistance
Women's Alliance Los Angeles
Women's Energy Matters

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund, Union of Concerned Scientists, Sierra Club California, and California Environmental Voters:

AB 825 represents a significant step toward modernizing California's energy infrastructure and enhancing collaboration across state lines to achieve a more resilient and sustainable energy future. By improving grid reliability, reducing electricity costs for Californians, and making significant strides toward our decarbonization goals, this legislation promises substantial benefits for all Californians.

ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to The Utility Reform Network:

TURN remains concerned that AB 825 contains insufficient safeguards to protect California consumers if the RO or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) takes actions to frustrate key state environmental, resource planning, reliability or other public interest policies. These adverse outcomes have become more likely given recent announcements by the Trump administration to prioritize coal-fired generation, devalue production from clean energy resources, and challenge the legitimacy of state climate policies. ...Additionally, TURN expresses concerns that language added to SB 540 to bolster safeguards against efforts to erode California's policies were not included in AB 825.

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 57-5, 6/5/25

AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Valencia, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Rivas

NOES: DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Sanchez, Tangipa

NO VOTE RECORDED: Alanis, Castillo, Chen, Davies, Flora, Gallagher, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Hoover, Lackey, Macedo, Ortega, Patterson, Ramos, Ta, Wallis, Zbur

Prepared by: Nidia Bautista / E., U. & C. / (916) 651-4107
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**** **END** ****