
THIRD READING

Bill No: AB 1889
Author: Ramos (D)
Amended: 8/21/26 in Senate
Vote: 21

SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 6/23/26
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Cortese, Pérez, Wiener

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 5/26/26 - See last page for vote

SUBJECT: Protective orders

SOURCE: Riverside County District Attorney's Office; San Bernardino County District Attorney's Office

DIGEST: This bill authorizes a court to issue post-conviction criminal protective order for certain domestic violence and sex offenses to be valid for up to 10 years, or two years after the defendant's release from prison, whichever is later. This bill authorizes a court to issue a post-conviction protective order for certain battery offenses to be valid for up to 15 years, or two years after the defendant's release from prison, whichever is later.

Senate Floor Amendments of 8/21/26 are technical triple jointing amendments to incorporate additional changes to Section 136.2 of the Penal Code as proposed by SB 1395 (Valladares, 2026) and AB 2261 (Dixon, 2026) to be operative only if AB 1889 and either or both of those bills are enacted and AB 1889 is enacted last.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

- 1) Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Penal (Pen.) Code, § 136.2, subd. (a).)

- 2) Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
- 3) Requires the court to consider issuing a protective or restraining order when the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, rape, statutory rape, spousal rape, or a crime that requires the defendant to register as a sex offender, while the matter is pending. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (e)(1).)
- 4) Requires the court, at the time of sentencing, to consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime when the defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, as specified, human trafficking, rape, statutory rape, spousal rape, pimping, pandering, a gang-related offense, elder abuse, stalking, a sexual offense involving a minor victim, or a crime that requires the defendant to register as a sex offender; existing law provides that the order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. (Pen. Code, §§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1); 368, subd. (l); 646.9, subd. (k); 1201.3, subd. (a).)
- 5) Provides that the post-conviction protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail, whether the defendant is subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation and provides that the order may be modified by the sentencing court in the county in which it was issued throughout the duration of the order. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).)
- 6) Provides that the duration of a protective order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, the safety of a victim and the victim's immediate family, and any information provided to the court, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).)
- 7) Requires the court, at the time of sentencing, to consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from contact with a victim of the crime when the defendant has been convicted of domestic violence involving corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition and provides that the order may be valid for up to 15 years, as determined by the court. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (j)(1) & (2).)
- 8) Authorizes the issuing court, upon a written petition by the prosecuting attorney, defendant, or victim, to modify or terminate a protective order for good cause

provided the prosecuting attorney, defendant, and victim are notified at least 15 days before the hearing on the petition. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (j)(1) & (2).)

- 9) Provides that a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order constitutes contempt of court, a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for up to one year or a fine of \$1,000, or both. (Pen. Code, §§ 166, subds. (a)(4), (c)(4); 273.6, subd. (a).)

This bill authorizes a court to issue or extend a postconviction criminal protective order so that, in specified witness intimidation, street gang, domestic violence, human trafficking, and sex offense cases, the order may remain in effect for up to two years after the defendant's release from custody if the release occurs after the original sentencing-based order for either 10 or 15 years has expired. This bill therefore ties the duration of victim protection more directly to the defendant's release date rather than allowing protection to lapse solely because time has run from the date of sentencing.

Background

As a general matter, a court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (a), where it finds good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. Protective orders issued under this statute are valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (*People v. Ponce* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)

When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has the authority to issue protective orders as a condition of probation in cases where probation was granted. In some cases in which probation has not been granted, the court also has the authority to issue post-conviction protective orders. The court is authorized to issue no-contact orders for up to 15 years when a defendant has been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of the defendant's child. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (j).) The court can also issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in the following types of cases: a domestic violence-related offense not involving willful infliction of corporal injury, human trafficking, rape, spousal rape, statutory rape, pimping, pandering, a gang-related offense, or any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) A post-conviction protective order lasting up to 10 years can also be issued in cases in which there was a conviction for stalking, or abuse of an elder or dependent adult. (Pen. Code, §§ 646.9, subd. (k), 368, subd. (l).) Similarly, in cases involving a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication for a sex offense in which the victim was a minor, the court may issue

an order “that would prohibit ... harassing, intimidating, or threatening the victim or the victim’s family members or spouse.” (Pen. Code, § 1201.3, subd. (a).)

The consequences of having the court issue a protective order against a person can be severe. For example, the protective order may prohibit the defendant from being within a certain distance of the person named in the order, implicating the defendant’s right to travel. Depending on the facts, such an order may implicate an individual’s property interests by forcing the person to vacate their own home. A protective order may also affect a person’s immigration status given that a violation of a protective order is a deportable offense. (8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(2)(E)(ii).) Additionally, the restrained person will generally not be able to purchase, receive, own, or possess a firearm and will have to turn in, sell, or transfer any firearms the person has, and will not be able to buy, receive, own, or possess a firearm while the order is in effect. (Pen. Code, §§ 29825, 136.2, subd. (d).)

Disobedience of a court order may be punished as criminal contempt. The crime of contempt is a general intent crime. It is proven by showing that the defendant intended to commit the prohibited act, without any additional showing that he or she intended “to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence.” (*People v. Greenfield* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.) Nevertheless, a violation must also be willful, which in the case of a court order encompasses both intent to disobey the order, and disregard of the duty to obey the order.” (*In re Karpf* (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 355, 372.)

Criminal contempt under Penal Code section 166 is a misdemeanor, and proceedings under the statute are conducted like any other misdemeanor offense. (*In re McKinney* (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10; *In re Kreitman* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) The criminal contempt power is vested in the prosecution, and the trial court has no power to institute criminal contempt proceedings under the Penal Code. (*In re McKinney*, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 13.) A defendant charged with the crime of contempt is “entitled to the full panoply of substantive and due process rights.” (*People v. Kalnoki* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th Supp. 8, 11.) The defendant has the right to a jury trial regardless of the sentence imposed. (*People v. Earley* (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 542, 550.)

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes

According to the Senate Committee on Appropriations:

The trial court costs of this bill are unclear but likely very significant. Because a qualifying defendant’s prison release date is unknown at the time

of sentencing, a court cannot issue a post-release TPO at sentencing. Instead, a court must hold an additional hearing close to a qualifying defendant's release from prison to issue the post-release TPO with appropriate effective dates.

Further, as it is not clear how readily the courts will learn each defendant's prison release date, additional court workload will be required to coordinate with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), which anticipates a significant prison population to be affected, and sheriffs, thereby increasing the impact on court calendars.

A violation of a protective order is punishable as a misdemeanor. The courts may experience additional cost pressures due to increased workload for adjudicating misdemeanor charges for violations of the temporary protective orders required by this bill. An eight-hour court day costs approximately \$10,500 based on the hourly rate of court personnel including at minimum the judge, clerk, bailiff, court reporter, jury administrator, administrative staff, and jury per-diems. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. The FY 2026-27 Budget appropriated \$70 million General Fund for this purpose. (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund)

Moderate cost pressure on the counties to incarcerate if a one year misdemeanor sentence is imposed. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately \$80,000. In 2021 Los Angeles County budgeted \$1.3 billion for jail costs with \$90,000 per incarcerated person. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012). Likely minor costs to sheriffs to coordinate release date information with the courts.

SUPPORT: (Verified 8/21/26)

American Association of University Women - California
American Association of University Women San Jose
California District Attorneys Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
Chief Probation Officers' of California
City of Fontana
Hilde B Foundation

League of California Cities
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Riverside County District Attorney

OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/21/26)

None received

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 5/26/26

AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Elhawary, Ellis, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, McKinnor, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas

NO VOTE RECORDED: Muratsuchi, Celeste Rodriguez

Prepared by: Natalia DaSilva Telles / PUB. S. /
8/24/26 13:38:02

**** **END** ****