

SENATE PRIVACY, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION COMMITTEE
Senator Christopher Cabaldon, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session

AB 1720 (Haney)
Version: May 18, 2026
Hearing Date: June 29, 2026
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
BD

SUBJECT

Ticket sellers.

DIGEST

This bill prohibits ticket resellers from selling a ticket for more than 10 percent of the original ticket price, subject to certain exemptions and parameters.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The war on tickets has been a years-long effort, with various pieces of legislation grappling with the issues posed by both the primary and secondary markets. This bill is the latest battleground and seeks to address high ticket prices in the secondary market. According to the National Independent Talent Organization, buyers were charged an average markup of 203 percent of the ticket's face value on the secondary market. Similarly, the average face value price of a ticket was \$67.47, while the average resale cost was \$129.22. These markups affect large events and small events alike, leaving consumers who were unable to secure a ticket on the primary market subject to these high prices.

This bill seeks to curb these costly tickets by establishing a 10 percent cap on tickets sold by ticket resellers. The bill further imposes various disclosure requirements on ticket resellers and the original market. Notably, however, this bill only applies to independent venues that have either a capacity of less than 3,000 people or are held at a nonprofit venue hosting live performances at agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events, and exempts certain event types from its application. This bill is sponsored by the National Independent Venue Association – California, National Independent Talent Organization, and Music Artists Coalition. It is supported by numerous artist and venue organizations. It is opposed by StubHub and other organizations. The bill passed out of the Senate Business Professions and Economic Development Committee on a vote of 6 to 2. Should the bill pass out of this Committee, it will next be heard by the Senate Judiciary Committee.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW

Existing law:

- 1) Establishes the Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act, which prohibits the use of automated bots to circumvent ticket purchase limits set by ticket sellers. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
- 2) Prohibits selling or offering to sell an event ticket obtained using an automated bot if the seller participated in, had the ability to control, or should have known about the violation. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
- 3) Prohibits any person who does not have the written permission of the owner or operator of the property on which an entertainment event is to be held or is being held, from selling tickets to the entertainment event, which were obtained for the purpose of resale, at any price which is in excess of the price that is printed or endorsed upon the ticket, while on the grounds of or in the stadium, arena, theater, or other place where an event for which admission tickets are sold is to be held or is being held. A violation of this law constitutes a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code § 346.)
- 4) Declares it unlawful for a person to intentionally use or sell software or services to circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other control or measure (including limits on the number of tickets a person can purchase) that is used to ensure an equitable ticket-buying process for event attendees. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.5.)
- 5) Defines a “ticket seller” as any person who for compensation, commission, or otherwise sells admission tickets to sporting, musical, theatre, or any other entertainment event. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22503.)
- 6) Clarifies that the following are not ticket sellers for purposes of existing law:
 - a. An officially appointed agent of an air carrier, ocean carrier, or motor coach carrier who purchases or sells tickets in conjunction with a tour package.
 - b. Any person who sells six tickets or less to any one single event, provided the tickets are sold off the event premises, including, but not limited to, designated parking areas and points of entry to the event.
 - c. The person or organization responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold, or a seller of tickets operating under a written contract with this person or organization.
 - d. Any nonprofit charitable tax-exempt organization selling tickets to an event sponsored by the organization. (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22503.5, 22503.6, 22504, 22511.)

- 7) Requires a ticket seller to have a permanent business address from which tickets may only be sold and that the address be included in any advertisement or solicitation. Makes a violation of this requirement a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a fine not exceeding \$2,500 or by both and provides for civil penalties of up to \$2,500 for violations. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22500.)
- 8) Requires ticket sellers:
 - a. Maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22501.)
 - b. Prior to sale, disclose to the purchaser by means of description or a map the location of the seat or seats represented by the ticket or tickets. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.)
 - c. Make any partial or full deposit refundable if received on a future event for which tickets are not available, except for a service charge of not more than 10 percent, until such time as tickets for the event are actually available. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22506.)
 - d. Provide a refund within 30 days for the ticket price of an event that is canceled. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(a).)
 - e. Provide a refund, upon request, within 30 days, for the ticket price of an event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(b).)
 - f. Provide that a local jurisdiction may require a bond of not more than \$50,000 to cover required refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(d).)
 - g. Disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22508.)
- 9) Prohibits a ticket seller from contracting to sell or accepting payment for tickets unless the ticket seller:
 - a. Has lawful possession of the ticket;
 - b. Has a contractual right to obtain the ticket; or
 - c. Informs the purchaser, in a specified manner, that it does not have possession of the ticket, has no contract to obtain the offered ticket, and may not be able to supply the ticket at the contracted price. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.1.)
- 10) Deems a violation of the chapter of the Business and Professions Code containing the provisions related to ticket sellers to be a misdemeanor. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22505.)

This bill:

- 1) Prohibits a ticket reseller from selling a ticket for more than the original price for the ticket plus 10 percent.

- a) Provides that this limit shall apply to the total price paid by the consumer and include any fees charged by the original seller or digital platform.
 - b) Prohibits a ticket reseller from evading this limit by imposing separate charges, processing fees, delivery fees, or other charges not included in the original ticket price in excess of 10 percent.
- 2) Requires the maximum resale price of a ticket, if a ticket has been resold or transferred more than once, to remain no more than 10 percent above the original purchase price, regardless of the purchase price in the resale market.
- 3) Requires an original seller to print or display the original purchase price of a ticket on the ticket.
- 4) Prohibits a ticket reseller from advertising a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than taxes or fees imposed by the government or postage or carriage charges that will be reasonably and actually incurred to ship the ticket to the consumer.
- 5) Prohibits a ticket resale marketplace from charging more than 10 percent of the original face value of the ticket in additional fees to the reseller or buyer of the ticket.
- 6) Requires a ticket resale marketplace to require a ticket reseller to disclose, on the ticket resale marketplace platform listing, the original price of the ticket.
- 7) Provides that the above provisions apply only to the resale of tickets for events at an independent venue and where either of the following occurs:
 - a) The seating capacity of the venue is 3,000 individuals or fewer.
 - b) The event is to be held at a nonprofit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events in addition to live performances.
- 8) Exempts the following from the above provisions:
 - a) A ticket to a professional athletic contest or event.
 - b) A ticket to an athletic contest by a season ticketholder or licenseholder.
 - c) A ticket to a collegiate or amateur athletic contest or event conducted by a college athletic association or a national governing body.
 - d) A ticket to an athletic contest or event, tournament, or series of games or matches involving athletes or teams representing foreign nations, including, but not limited to, the FIFA World Cup or Olympics.
- 9) Provides that, upon an action brought by the Attorney General, a city attorney, or a county counsel, an original seller, ticket reseller, or ticket resale marketplace that violates the above provisions shall be liable for \$1,000 per ticket sold for a first violation and up to \$2,500 per ticket sold for subsequent violations. Provides that a

knowing and willful pattern or practice of violation of this section shall be punishable by a civil penalty of up to \$5,000 per ticket.

10) Provides that the Attorney General, county counsel, or city attorney, who prevails in action to enforce the above provisions shall be entitled to injunctive relief, restitution, or disgorgement of any proceeds obtained as a result of the violation.

11) Defines the following terms:

- a) "Independent venue" means an event space that derives a majority of its revenue from ticket events, is not majority owned by a publicly traded company, and does not operate venues in more than 10 states.
- b) "Original seller" means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event for original sale as instructed by an event presenter, event organizer, rights holder, or venue operator.
- c) "Ticket resale marketplace" means an entity that, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, processes payments for, facilitates the resale of, or resells an admission ticket for, a sporting, musical, theater, or other live entertainment event.
- d) "Ticket reseller" means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical theater, or other entertainment event other than a ticket for original sale sold by an original seller.

COMMENTS

1. Welcome to ticket land

The digital age has had profound impacts on many industries and aspects of life; this includes the ticketing world. Long gone are the days of camping out overnight to secure a ticket to see one's favorite artist, sports team, or performer. Nowadays, the battle at the box office begins online, and warfare can continue far after a ticket is initially sold. This is largely due to the current dynamics and methodology of ticket buying, which can be split into two categories: the primary market and secondary market.

Whenever someone purchases a ticket directly from a venue, event organizer, or their online ticket platform, they are buying from the primary market. These types of ticket sellers are generally referred to as original sellers. Many venues elect to use a third party to facilitate their online ticket sales. The prices of the primary market heavily impact availability and the prices on the secondary market, but generally, the primary market may sell tickets below market value. This is done to ensure a full show and to maximize venue and event expenses, such as merchandise, food, and drink.

The secondary market refers to ticket resellers. Platforms like StubHub, SeatGeek, TickPick, Vivid Seats, and others are all marketplaces that facilitate transactions between a potential consumer and a ticket reseller, who initially purchased the ticket from the primary market. Resellers, who are generally not associated with these platforms, use the secondary marketplace to secure valid, authentic transactions between themselves and consumers. They also provide consumers who, for various reasons, may no longer be able to attend the event with a way to recoup some of their money.

Further complicating this landscape is the fact that there can be overlap between the primary and secondary markets. For instance, Ticketmaster, which facilitates primary market sales, also has a resale platform.

Tickets listed on the secondary market can often be much more expensive than those on the primary market. Tickets sold out on the primary market are often subject to even higher markups. In 2023, the National Independent Talent Organization, which is a sponsor of this bill, conducted a study on ticket resales and found that buyers were charged an average markup of 203 percent of the ticket's face value on the secondary market. Similarly, the average face value price of a ticket was \$67.47, while the average resale cost was \$129.22.¹ This, quite evidently, leads to serious consumer frustration.

This bad blood was especially pronounced during Taylor Swift's 2024 Eras Tour. Tickets in the primary market were roughly a few hundred dollars. However, due to increasingly high demand, living out a consumer's love story with a resold ticket was quite an expensive endeavor:

Prices to see Swift at one of her final nine shows in the United States have increased following the release of the album April 19, with the average get-in-the-door price – the lowest price available – hovering around \$2,600 per ticket, according to data from TicketIQ. That means it would cost a couple more than \$5,000 just to be in the same building as Swift in Miami (Oct 18-20), New Orleans (Oct 25-27) and Indianapolis (Nov. 1-3) [in 2024].²

Due to these resale opportunities, there exists an entire world of professional ticket brokers and resellers who purchase tickets from the primary market with the express intent of reselling them on the secondary market. Inherently, ticket brokers have a competitive edge over the average consumer:

¹ NITO Ticket Study (2023) National Independent Talent Organization, <https://nitolive.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/NITO-Ticket-Resale-Study.pdf>. All internet citations are current as of June 24, 2026.

² Dave Brooks, *Why are Taylor Swift Eras Tour Tickets so much Cheaper in Europe?* (May 5, 2024) Billboard, <https://www.billboard.com/business/touring/taylor-swift-eras-tour-tickets-cheaper-europe-1235671760/>.

Brokers whose business is to purchase and resell tickets have a competitive advantage over individual consumers because they have the technology and resources to purchase large numbers of tickets as soon as they go on sale. Some consumer advocates, state officials, and event organizers believe that brokers unfairly use this advantage to obtain tickets from the primary market, which restricts ordinary consumers from buying tickets at face value. As a result, consumers may pay higher prices than they would if tickets were available on the primary market. In addition, some event organizers and primary ticket sellers have expressed frustration that the profits from the higher resale price accrue to brokers who have not played a role in creating or producing the event.³

Exacerbating this disparity are technological tools used to secure tickets (bots). Bots are commonly employed by ticket brokers to ensure that they can readily attain a large quantity of tickets:

When tickets first go on sale, bots can complete multiple simultaneous searches of the primary ticket seller's website and reserve or purchase hundreds of tickets, according to the 2016 report by the New York State Office of the Attorney General. Seats reserved by a bot – even if ultimately not purchased – appear online to a consumer as unavailable. This, in turn, can make inventory appear artificially low during the first minutes of the sale and lead consumers to the secondary market to seek available seats, according to event organizers we interviewed. Bots can also automate the ticket-buying process, as well as identify when additional tickets are released and available for purchase. During its investigation of the ticketing industry, the New York State Office of the Attorney General identified an instance in which a bot bought more than 1,000 tickets to a single event in 1 minute.⁴

That is not to say that the primary market does not have its own substantial issues. Mainly, the primary market is dominated by Live Nation, which owns Ticketmaster, the main primary ticket vendor. In 2024, the United States Department of Justice joined multiple state and district attorneys to file an antitrust lawsuit against Live Nation. As explained by the initial filing:

Live Nation directly manages more than 400 musical artists and, in total, controls around 60% of concert promotions at major concert venues across the country. Live Nation also owns or controls more than 265 concert

³ *Event Ticket Sales: Market Characteristics and Consumer Protection Issues* (April 2018) United States Government Accountability Office. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-347.pdf>.

⁴ *Ibid.*

venues in North America, including more than 60 of the top 100 amphitheaters in the United States. For comparison, its closest rival owns no more than a handful of top amphitheaters. And, of course, through Ticketmaster, Live Nation controls roughly 80% or more of major concert venues' primary ticketing for concerts and a growing share of ticket resales in the secondary market.⁵

Among other anticompetitive conduct, the complaint accused Live Nation of retaliation, acquiring competitors, locking out competition, and restricting artist access to venues.⁶ In early 2026, the United States Department of Justice announced a settlement agreement, which, among other items, placed limits on long-term exclusivity contracts, required a 50-50 split on exclusivity agreements, and required partial divestment. However, this settlement was rejected by numerous state attorneys general out of concern that the settlement was too lenient and did not break up Live Nation's monopoly. The remaining attorneys general proceeded with the antitrust suit, leading to a jury finding Live Nation liable for harming consumers through anticompetitive conduct. Following this verdict, various remedies have been sought. As explained by a press release for California Attorney General Rob Bonta:

"A jury found Live Nation manipulated the market, hurt artists, fans, and businesses nationwide, all while getting richer – not because it is better, but because it acted illegally. Now, it's time to ensure they can't hurt consumers or the live ticketing industry again," said Attorney General Bonta. "Today, alongside a bipartisan coalition, I asked the court to break up Live Nation and Ticketmaster. It is vital that we secure strong structural remedies that prevent Live Nation's anticompetitive conduct from continuing. As evidence in our trial clearly showed, we cannot trust this behemoth of a company to do the right thing by consumers."⁷

2. Price caps

In response to high ticket prices, price caps have emerged as a potential solution. As explained by the GAO:

Several states have caps on the price at which tickets can be resold, while others have repealed caps and some studies have questioned their enforceability. For example, Kentucky generally prohibits the resale of event tickets for more than either face value or the amount charged by the venue, and Massachusetts prohibits resale by brokers of most tickets for

⁵ <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/File%20stamp%20LNE%20Complaint.pdf>.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Attorney General Bonta Asks Court to Break Up Live Nation/Ticketmaster* (May 21, 2026) Office of Attorney General, <https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-asks-court-break-live-nationticketmaster>.

more than \$2 above face value, with the exception of relevant service charges. New Jersey allows a maximum markup of 20 percent or \$3 (whichever is greater) for nonbrokers and a maximum markup of 50 percent for registered brokers, but does not limit resale prices for nonbrokers for sales over the Internet. A number of other states – including Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and Connecticut – repealed their price cap laws in the 2000s.

However, the New York State Attorney General’s 2016 report recommended bringing back a price cap, through a “reasonable limit” on resale markups. Price caps are generally intended to protect consumers from high markups and increase the fairness of ticket distribution so that the wealthiest consumers do not have disproportionate access to tickets. In theory, price caps offer consumers the advantages of nontransferable tickets without the disadvantages: they limit high secondary-market prices but still allow consumers to transfer tickets to others or resell tickets they cannot use.⁸

While price caps do have their benefits, there have also been concerns raised about their limitations. The same GAO report notes that enforcement can be challenging, can create economic inefficiencies, and force resale activity underground.⁹ Additionally, fraud is often cited as a primary reason why price caps may be ineffective. However, fraud in the ticketing world is, unfortunately, already commonplace. As aptly noted by the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee:

The unfortunate reality is whenever there is a concert, game, or other extremely popular team, artist or event, people will find a way to defraud consumers, completely unrelated to whether there is a price cap or not. For decades, along with ticket fraud fans, artists and sports teams have had to contend with bootlegged music and movies and counterfeit sports jerseys and other memorabilia.

Furthermore, in the context of Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour, the high prices in the United States were not seen in European countries. In fact, fans calculated that it would actually be cheaper to purchase flights, book a hotel, and spend a few days in Europe while still being less expensive than a ticket in the United States.¹⁰ Billboard proposes the following argument:

⁸ *Event Ticket Sales: Market Characteristics and Consumer Protection Issues* (April 2018) United States Government Accountability Office. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-347.pdf>.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Dave Brooks, *Why are Taylor Swift Eras Tour Tickets so much Cheaper in Europe?* (May 5, 2024) Billboard, <https://www.billboard.com/business/touring/taylor-swift-eras-tour-tickets-cheaper-europe-1235671760/>.

In countries like France, Germany and the Netherlands, ticket resellers face limits on how much tickets can be marked up on secondary sites — typically 20% over face value. Other countries like the United Kingdom allow resale but restrict who is allowed to post tickets for resale and give artists and event promoters the right to take some resale ticket listings down.¹¹

This argument appears to have gained traction across the nation. Multiple states are considering ticket caps in 2026, with Maine already passing one in 2025.¹²

3. What this bill does

This bill seeks to address these high ticket prices by capping the resale price of a ticket to 10 percent above the original purchase price of a ticket, including fees, and requires ticket resellers to disclose the original price of the ticket. It further prohibits a ticket resale marketplace from charging fees over 10 percent and requires ticket resale marketplaces to obtain and display pricing information about the resale ticket. The bill also requires original sellers to print or display the original purchase price on tickets. Lastly, this bill authorizes public enforcement for violations of the aforementioned provisions.

Importantly, this bill applies only to ticket resales for events held at an independent venue with a seating capacity of 3,000 or fewer, or at a non-profit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events featuring live performances. It also exempts tickets to professional athletic events, season ticket holder tickets, tickets to collegiate athletics association events, the FIFA World Cup, and the Olympics.

According to the author:

For decades, concert tickets were sold at face value to real fans who wanted to see the artists they loved. But today, professional scalpers and bots buy up tickets in seconds and resell them at massive markups. This bill puts an end to that system and puts the concert experience back where it belongs: with fans and artists.

Concert tickets aren't stocks to be flipped for profit. They're a chance for real fans to see the artists they love. Yet for years we've let out-of-state

¹¹ Dave Brooks, *Why are Taylor Swift Eras Tour Tickets so much Cheaper in Europe?* (May 5, 2024) Billboard, <https://www.billboard.com/business/touring/taylor-swift-eras-tour-tickets-cheaper-europe-1235671760/>.

¹² Nicole Ogrysko, *Maine's new ticketing transparency law could be a model for others, music industry advocates say* (June 20, 2025) Maine Public, <https://www.mainepublic.org/business-and-economy/2025-06-20/maines-new-ticketing-transparency-law-could-be-a-model-for-others-music-industry-advocates-say>.

scalpers and speculators cut the line, buy up tickets in bulk, and resell them at outrageous markups, shutting out fans while taking the lion's share of the money. They didn't write the songs. They didn't build the venues. They didn't clean the bathrooms. They didn't put on the show. But they're the ones cashing in. That's not fair, and it's not inevitable. California is the heart of the music industry, and we have a duty to stand with fans, artists, and venues, not speculators and scalpers. This is about restoring common sense and making sure live music is about community and culture, not price-gouging and profiteering.

It is important to note the harsh limitations of this bill. The bill only applies to small, independent venues. It, therefore, excludes large venues that host world-famous artists, performers, and talent. Arguably, these events would be the ones that need a price cap the most, as they are the events subject to the highest markups. As aptly noted by the Senate Business, Professions, and Economic Development Committee, if the bill is intended to address excessive resale prices and improve ticket affordability, it is noteworthy that it excludes the events where fans and consumers are most likely to encounter the very practices it seeks to address. In the worst-case scenario, this bill could implicitly endorse the view that price caps should not apply to larger venues and record-breaking shows, leaving consumer harm unaddressed.

4. Stakeholder positions

A coalition of artist groups and venues, including the California Arts Advocates, writes in support:

The need is clear. Professional ticket flippers and bots routinely buy up large quantities of tickets within seconds, shutting out real fans and immediately relisting at extreme markups. Across 65 shows studied nationwide, secondary-market prices averaged roughly twice face value. Here in California, general-admission tickets priced at \$32 have been resold for \$56, \$61, \$200, and in some cases more than \$4,000 for the exact same seat. This is not a competitive market working as intended; it is industrial-scale extraction that pulls revenue away from the artists, crews, venues, and local economies that actually create live events.

It is important to be clear about what AB 1720 does and does not do. The bill targets the brokers and resellers who dominate the resale market and aggregate inventory across multiple platforms. It does not target legitimate, consumer-to-consumer resale by fans whose plans change. By removing the financial incentive for bulk speculation, AB 1720 helps ensure more tickets reach real fans at prices closer to what artists intended.

The Consumer Federation of California writes in opposition:

This last point is why AB 1720 should be voted down by the California Legislature. Monopolies never admit they are monopolies, and monopolies will do anything to enhance their monopoly and market power. Were AB 1720 to become law the main beneficiary of the bill would actually be the monopoly itself. How? The bill caps prices and profits for the precious few competitors to the monopoly but does nothing to limit the monopoly's predatory behavior against consumers and others. But what about the talking point that the monopoly itself will be trimmed under this bill? This is essentially known as a loss-leader strategy - the monopoly pretends to be making a big sacrifice for consumers, but their real objective is to harm the economics of the secondary ticketing industry such that this limited competition would be diminished and ultimately eliminated. Does anybody actually think that if the monopoly gained more control over the secondary ticketing market this would be good for consumers in the long run? Only a monopolist would defend such an action.

A group of secondary market platforms, including SeatGeek, write in opposition:

Resale platforms compete by enabling third-party sellers, who very often offer fans lower prices than the primary seller, i.e., Ticketmaster. Sellers offering below-face-value prices are why Ticketmaster frequently imposes resale price floors on consumers whose plans change after they purchase tickets. In a future Ticketmaster-dominated resale world with price floors, there will be little-to-no room for discounting. This will eliminate price competition and consumers seeking less expensive resale tickets will lose.

SUPPORT

American Association of Independent Music
American Federation of Musicians
Artist Rights Alliance
Black Music Action Coalition
California Arts Advocates
Fan Alliance
Folk Alliance International
Future of Music Coalition
Music Artists Coalition
Music Artists Coalition (MAC)
Music Managers Forum - US
National Independent Talent Organization
National Independent Venue Association of California (NIVA-CA)

Oakland; City of
Recording Academy
Recording Industry Association of America
Sag-aftra
Songwriters of North America
Venue Pilot

OPPOSITION

California Black Chamber of Commerce
California Hispanic Chambers of Commerce (CHCC)
California League of United Latin American Citizens (ca Lulac)
California Live Events Equity Alliance
California Multicultural Business Alliance
Central Valley Latino Mayors and Elected Officials Coalition
Coalition for Ticket Fairness
Consumer Federation of California
Gametime
Hispanic 100
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce of San Francisco
Latin American and Caribbean Business Chamber of Commerce
Latin Business Association
National Action Network Sacramento
National Baptist Convention Usa, INC
North Valley Yemen Society
Pantone 294
Seatgeek, INC.
Si Se Puede Fresno, Tulare, Kings & Kern
Stubhub, INC.
Ticket Policy Forum
Tickpick, LLC
Valley Industry and Commerce Association (VICA)

RELATED LEGISLATION

AB 1349 (Bryan, 2026) would prohibit speculative ticket sales, bolster existing law related to software and service circumvention to purchase tickets, and prohibit the use of deceptive practices for the purpose of selling or reselling tickets. AB 1349 is set to be heard in this Committee on the same day as this bill.

AB 1291 (Lee, 2025) would have required a ticket seller to immediately provide proof of purchase to a consumer and required a venue operator to honor that proof of purchase in lieu of a ticket, as specified. AB 1291 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.

SB 785 (Caballero, 2024) would have prohibited the advertisement, sale, or contract for a ticket if a ticket seller did not own, possess, have constructive possession, or have the contractual right to sell a ticket and prohibited ticket sellers or ticket resale marketplaces from using an internet website with the intent to mislead. SB 785 died on the Assembly Inactive File.

AB 2808 (Wicks, 2024) would have prohibited a contract between a primary ticket seller and a venue operator from providing for the primary ticket reseller to be the exclusive ticket seller of an event and prohibited a contract between the two from being longer than three years. AB 2808 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.

SB 478 (Dodd, Ch. 378, Stats. 2023) made it an unlawful business practice pursuant to the Consumer Legal Remedies Act to advertise, display, or offer a price for a good or service that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than taxes imposed by a government.

AB 8 (Friedman, 2023) would have required all-in ticket pricing and transparency on the fees and would have required ticket sellers to allow for the transferability of tickets. AB 8 was held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

SB 829 (Wilk, 2023) prohibited the operator of an entertainment facility and a primary ticket seller from entering into a contract that provides for the primary ticket seller to be the exclusive ticket seller for the operator of the entertainment facility. SB 829 died in the Assembly Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism Committee.

AB 1556 (Friedman, Ch. 180, Stats. 2021) required for cancelled events, that a refund be made within 30 calendar days of the cancellation; and requires a ticket price at any event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time be fully refunded to the purchaser by the ticket seller upon request within 30 calendar days of the refund request.

SB 342 (Hertzberg, Ch. 162, Stats. 2020) made it unlawful to register, traffic in, or use the name of a professional sports team or the names of professional sports leagues, among others, in a domain or subdomain name of a website to sell tickets in a fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading manner. It provided a private right of action to a person who suffers an economic injury as a result of such misconduct.

AB 329 (Pan, Ch. 325, Stats. 2013) made it a misdemeanor to intentionally use or sell software to circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other control or measure on a ticket seller's website that is used to ensure an equitable ticket buying process.

PRIOR VOTES:

Assembly Floor (Ayes 49, Noes 16)

Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 3)

Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 9, Noes 4)

Assembly Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism Committee (Ayes 6, Noes 1)
