

Date of Hearing: April 30, 2024

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Ash Kalra, Chair
AB 2587 (Aguiar-Curry) – As Amended April 22, 2024

As Proposed to be Amended

SUBJECT: SEXUAL ASSAULT: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

KEY ISSUE: SHOULD SOME CLAIMS FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT THAT ARE TIME BARRED AS OF JANUARY 1, 2025 SOLELY BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, OTHER THAN CLAIMS AGAINST PUBLIC ENTITIES, BE REVIVED AND ALLOWED TO BE FILED FOR A TWO YEAR PERIOD BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 2025 AND DECEMBER 31, 2026?

SYNOPSIS

California has long recognized the unique problem that SOLs create in sexual assault cases. Victims often delay coming forward for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, lack of trust, fear, or some combination thereof. Fortunately, the Legislature has the power to create, extend, and change statutes of limitation, as it deems appropriate. In 2023, AB 2777 (Wicks, Chap. 442, Stats. 2022) revived some lapsed claims for adult sexual assault and others for childhood sexual assault. Relevant to this bill, it revived claims for sexual assault alleging that one or more entities or their agents engaged in a “cover up” of the sexual assault, or other inappropriate conduct, communication, or activity of a sexual nature. The bill revived claims that otherwise would be barred before January 1, 2023. Those claims, once revived, could be filed during a one-year period between January 1, 2023 and December 31, 2023. According to the author of this bill, “Unfortunately, courts have interpreted AB 2777 to only allow sexual assault survivors to recover damages from the entities that engaged in the cover up, not the perpetrators of sexual assault. This is not consistent with the intent of AB 2777 and this bill seeks to include the perpetrators as a party that can be held responsible for damages.”

This bill, sponsored by Victim Policy Institute, revives some time-lapsed claims for sexual assault. Specifically, it revives a claim seeking to recover damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault that occurred on or after the plaintiff’s 18th birthday that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2025, solely because the applicable statute of limitations and allows a cause of action to proceed if already pending in court on January 1, 2025, or, if not filed by that date, to be commenced between January 1, 2025, and December 31, 2026. The type of claims that may be revived under the bill, as it is proposed to be amended, are those alleging that the plaintiff was sexually assaulted and one of the following: (1) one or more entities or persons, including the perpetrator of the sexual assault, are legally responsible for damages arising out of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator against the plaintiff; or (2) an entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse. The author’s amendments are incorporated into the SUMMARY, below, and explained in the analysis. The bill is supported by the Consumer Attorneys of California and a number of groups advocating for survivors of sexual assault. It is opposed by a coalition of business groups.

SUMMARY: Revives a claim for sexual assault against a private entity that is time barred as of January 1, 2025 solely because of the statute of limitations and allows it to be filed for a two year period if it meets specified criteria. Specifically, **this bill:**

- 1) Revives for a two year period, beginning on January 1, 2025 and until December 31, 2026, a claim that is time barred as of January 1, 2025 solely because of the statute of limitations and allows it to be filed, or allows it to proceed if already filed as of January 1, 2025; specifies that claims by a plaintiff who alleges that the plaintiff was sexually assaulted and one of the following are revived:
 - a) One or more entities or persons, including the perpetrator of the sexual assault, are legally responsible for damages arising out of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator against the plaintiff.
 - b) An entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.
- 2) Clarifies that the term “legally responsible” means that the *person*, entity, or entities are liable under any theory of liability established by statute or common law, including, but not limited to, negligence, intentional torts, and vicarious liability.
- 3) Clarifies that the bill does not revive either of the following:
 - a) A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2025.
 - b) A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2025.

EXISTING LAW:

- 1) Revives claims for sexual assault of an adult that are based upon conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009, and commenced on or after January 1, 2019, that would have been barred solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired. Specifies that such claims are hereby revived and may be commenced until December 31, 2026. Specifies that the bill does not revive either of the following claims:
 - a) A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2023.
 - b) A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2023. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.16 (b)(3). All further statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise indicated.)
- 2) Provides that, notwithstanding any other law, any claim seeking to recover damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2023, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if already pending in court on January 1, 2023, or, if not filed by

that date, may be commenced between January 1, 2023, and December 31, 2023. Specifies that the bill revives claims brought by a plaintiff who alleges all of the following:

- a) The plaintiff was sexually assaulted.
 - b) One or more entities are legally responsible for damages arising out of the sexual assault.
 - c) The entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegation of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.
 - d) Failure to allege a cover up as required as to one entity does not affect revival of the plaintiff's claim or claims against any other entity. (Section 340.16 (e)(1) – (3).)
- 3) Defines the following for purposes of 2), above:
- a) "Cover up" means a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to a sexual assault that incentivizes individuals to remain silent or prevents information relating to a sexual assault from becoming public or being disclosed to the plaintiff, including, but not limited to, the use of nondisclosure agreements or confidentiality agreements.
 - b) "Entity" means a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or other legal entity.
 - c) "Legally responsible" means that the entity or entities are liable under any theory of liability established by statute or common law, including, but not limited to, negligence, intentional torts, and vicarious liability. (*Id.*, at (e)(4).)
- 4) Specifies that 2), above, revives any related claims, including, but not limited to, wrongful termination and sexual harassment, arising out of the sexual assault that is the basis for a claim. (*Id.*, at (e)(5).)
- 5) Specifies that 2), above, does not revive either of the following claims:
- a) A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2023.
 - b) A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2023. (*Id.*, at (e)(6).)
- 6) Clarifies that 2), above, shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Evidence Code Section 115, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section. (*Id.*, at (e)(7).)
- 7) Clarifies that 2), above, does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing an action for sexual assault pursuant to laws governing sexual assault of a person 18 years and older, or pursuant to 1), above. (*Id.*, at (e)(8).)

FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.

COMMENTS: This bill, sponsored by Victim Policy Institute, revives some time-lapsed claims for sexual assault. Specifically, it revives a claim seeking to recover damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault that occurred on or after the plaintiff's 18th birthday that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2025, solely because the applicable statute of limitations and allows a cause of action to proceed if already pending in court on January 1, 2025, or, if not filed by that date, to be commenced between January 1, 2025, and December 31, 2026. The type of claims that may be revived under the bill, as it is proposed to be amended, are those alleging that the plaintiff was sexually assaulted and one of the following:

(1) One or more entities or persons, including the perpetrator of the sexual assault, are legally responsible for damages arising out of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator against the plaintiff.

(2) An entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.

According to the author:

In 2022, the Legislature passed AB 2777 (Wicks, Chapter 442, Statutes of 2022) to protect survivors of sexual assault by opening a one-year window for survivors to bring claims against the entities who harmed them. However, as survivors have tried to access their overdue recourse, they have encountered problems as courts make determinations about the intent of the Legislature. Notably, courts have prevented survivors from holding the individual who perpetrated the sexual assault accountable, which is not consistent with the original intent of the bill.

Today, AB 2587 will clarify that the legislature intends to hold both the perpetrators of sexual assault and entities who covered up or willfully ignored the assault accountable for the harms inflicted on survivors, regardless of when the assault occurred. This bill allows additional time for survivors to seek restitution and act on the clearer signals sent by this bill. However, nothing in the bill changes any legal standard or burden of proof with regard to any claim brought before a judge or court. Victims must still prove all the elements of their claims regardless of when the sexual assault occurred.

At a moment of reckoning in the United States about sexual assault, California has made landmark policies that recognize it can take years for many survivors to come forward due to trauma, stigma, fears of backlash, or other complex factors. With this bill, California ensures survivors of sexual assault can continue to come forward while maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.

The bill defines "entity" to mean "a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or other legal entity." Therefore the bill does not apply to public entities. *The author may wish to consider whether the rights of victims of sexual assault for which public entities are responsible, or that they covered up, are adequately and fairly protected under existing law, given that this bill will not apply to them.*

The Legislature has the power to create, extend, and change statutes of limitation, as it deems appropriate. The policy behind statutes of limitations provides that they "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to

slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” (3 Witkin, California Procedure Section 433, 4th Ed.)

Nonetheless, courts have acknowledged that, “the need for repose is not so overarching that the Legislature cannot by express legislative provision allow certain actions to be brought at any time, and it has occasionally done so.” (*Duty v. Abex Corp* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 742, 749 [citations omitted].) The United States Supreme Court has long held that:

Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. . . . They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate against the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable or unavoidable delay Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a "fundamental right" [T]he history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control. (*Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson* (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314.)

With regard to reviving cases previously barred by a statute of limitations, in *Liebig v. Superior Court* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828 and *Lent v. Doe* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1177, the courts cited *Chase Securities* and affirmed the Legislature's power to *revive* civil causes of action, even if the actions were otherwise barred by the running of the statute of limitations. In both cases, the appellate courts upheld against constitutional attack the retroactive application of prior legislation amending CCP Section 340.1 to revive childhood abuse actions that had lapsed or technically expired under prior law. Similarly, in *Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1049, the appellate court upheld the Legislature's revival of certain insurance claims arising out of the Northridge Earthquake that were not brought previously and otherwise were time-barred, allowing the claimants a one-year window to file the revived actions. (SB 1899 (Burton), Chap. 1090, Stats. 2000, enacting CCP Section 340.9.)

Perhaps most importantly for purposes of this bill, the California Supreme Court, in *Quarry v. Doe I* (2009) 53 Cal.4th 945, held that the provision of CCP 340.1, allowing a plaintiff over 26 years of age to file suit against specified third parties in specified circumstances, did not apply to claims that had lapsed under prior law; the Court did not say that the Legislature *could not* revive the claims by express terms, but rather (the majority) held that the Legislature *had not* expressly done so.

The Legislature has authority to establish—and to enlarge—limitations periods. . . . [H]owever, legislative enlargement of a limitations period does not revive lapsed claims in the absence of **express language of revival**. This rule of construction grows out of an understanding of the difference between prospective and retroactive application of statutes. . . . As long as the former limitations period has not expired, an enlarged limitations period ordinarily applies and is said to apply prospectively to govern cases that are pending when, or instituted after, the enactment took effect. This is true even though the underlying conduct that is the subject of the litigation occurred prior to the new enactment. . . . However, when it comes to applying amendments that enlarge the limitations period to claims as to which the limitations period has expired before the amendment became law—that is, claims that have lapsed—the analysis is different. Once a claim has lapsed (under the formerly applicable statute of limitations), revival of the claim is seen as a retroactive application of the law

under an enlarged statute of limitations. **Lapsed claims will not be considered revived without express language of revival.** (*Quarry v. Doe I (Quarry)* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 955-957 [emphasis added, internal citations omitted].)

This bill, unlike the statute at issue in *Quarry*, includes express language of revival.

The purpose of statutes of limitations and their evolving application to actions alleging sexual assault. Unless there is a statute providing otherwise, the time for bringing a tort action is two years after the injury occurs or, depending upon the type of injury, two years after the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury. Statutes of limitation reflect the reality that, over time, evidence is lost or destroyed and witnesses' memories fade. However, current laws regarding the statute of limitations for sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often delay coming forward for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, lack of trust, fear, or some combination thereof.

Prior to 2019, the statute of limitations for bringing a cause of action alleging sexual assault of an adult was two years, the same as any other tort action. The enactment of AB 1619 (Berman), Chap. 939, Stats. 2018, which coincided with the "Me Too" and "Time's Up" movements, reflected a widespread consensus among professionals and women's advocates that survivors of sexual assault often need more than two years to process and engage with the legal system to seek a legal remedy. As a result, AB 1619 created Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.16, which extended the time for bringing an action seeking damages for sexual assault of an adult to ten years after the date of the assault, or three years after the plaintiff discovered that an injury or illness was the result of the assault, whichever date is later. While the concept of "discovery" is an important equitable principle in civil procedure, it is especially important in sexual assault cases, where memories might be repressed or the connection between an assault and later psychological or physical manifestations may not be apparent for some time.

However, AB 1619 did not expressly *revive* civil claims for sexual assault that were time-barred because of lapsed statutes of limitations by including the explicit revival language which the California Supreme Court held in *Quarry* to be required. Therefore, despite the new ten-year period to file claims provided by AB 1619, a claim based upon a sexual assault more than two years prior to the date when that bill went into effect (January 1, 2019) remained time-barred, while claims based upon sexual assault less than two years prior, and at any point after, that effective date, still *could* be filed, which seems somewhat arbitrary and unfair. Disclosures of sexual assaults at student health centers at both USC and UCLA, over an extended period of time, provides examples of cases in which even the extended time frame for bringing civil claims under AB 1619 proved to be inadequate.

Adult sexual assaults at USC. A gynecologist at USC who treated patients at the university's student health center committed multiple and egregious assaults on college-aged women over a period of nearly thirty years, from 1988 until 2017. The rationale for extending statutes of limitation for victims of sexual assault were especially appropriate for college students, many of whom were experiencing their first gynecological exam and therefore did not know that the procedures the doctor subjected them to were medically unnecessary or inappropriate. For many women, it was only when the sexual assaults were widely reported that they realized they had been assaulted or abused. In 2019, therefore, the Legislature enacted AB 1510 (Reyes), Chap. 462, Stats. 2019, which revived otherwise time-barred causes of action arising out of a sexual

assault, or related sexual misconduct, committed by a physician at a college or university student health center, between 1988 and 2017.

Specifically, AB 1510 provided that an otherwise time-barred cause of action may proceed if already pending in court on October 2, 2019, or, if not filed by that date, could be commenced between January 1, 2020 and December 31, 2020. In short, it created a one-year window in which a plaintiff could revive or newly file a claim that would otherwise be dismissed because of a failure to bring the case in a timely manner under the applicable statute of limitation. Because the author of AB 1510 wanted to limit that revival to the unique situation at USC, the bill exempted assaults that occurred at a student health center at any public college or university. In addition, AB 1510 only applied to causes of actions seeking more than \$250,000 in damages. This monetary limitation reflected the fact that many victims had become part of a settlement agreement with USC that limited damages to \$250,000. AB 1510 allowed survivors who sought more than that limited amount to not join (or opt out of) the settlement without having their individual action barred by the statute of limitation.

Adult sexual assaults at UCLA. Dr. James Heaps, a physician employed by UCLA, in both its student health centers and its medical center, allegedly committed sexual assaults against over 100 women over the course of his career that lasted from 1983 to 2018. To the extent that the existing statute of limitation would bar any of these women's legal claims against the doctor or UCLA, AB 3092 (Wicks), Chap. 246, Stats. 2020, revived those claims, allowing a cause of action to proceed if it were already pending as of January 1, 2021, or any claim to be commenced between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2021. Like AB 1510, AB 3092 created a one-year window to bring or revive otherwise time-barred claims. Also, like AB 1510, AB 3092 did not revive any claim that had been litigated to finality or was already subject to an approved settlement agreement. Unlike AB 1510, however, AB 3092 did not include the \$250,000 limitation, as that limitation was in response to the settlement agreement reached between USC and a specific class of plaintiffs. Like AB 1510, AB 3092 revived claims based on sexual assault, as well as claims based on "other inappropriate contact, communication, or activity of a sexual nature." It appears that most of the young women assaulted at both USC and UCLA were subject to behavior that would meet the statutory definition of sexual assault, but some claims alleged other kinds of conduct, such as demeaning comments or unnecessary and prurient procedures, that might fall short of sexual assault.

The most recent revival statute regarding sexual assault of an adult is AB 2777 (Wicks, Chap. 442, Stats. 2022) that allowed some time-barred claims to be revived for a one-year period in 2023 if there was a "cover up" of a sexual assault. AB 2777 revived some lapsed claims for adult sexual assault and others for childhood sexual assault. Relevant to this bill, it revived claims alleging that one or more entities or their agents engaged in a "cover up" of a sexual assault, or other inappropriate conduct, communication, or activity of a sexual nature. The bill revived claims that otherwise would be barred before January 1, 2023. Those claims, once revived, were allowed to be filed during a one-year period between January 1, 2023 and December 31, 2023. According to the author of this bill, "Unfortunately, courts have interpreted AB 2777 to only allow sexual assault survivors to recover damages from the *entities* that engaged in the cover up, not the *perpetrators* of sexual assault. This is not consistent with the intent of AB 2777 and this bill seeks to include the perpetrators as a party that can be held responsible for damages."

Author's amendments. As mentioned above, the author's intent is to "clarify that the legislature intends to hold both the perpetrators of sexual assault and entities who covered up or willfully

ignored the assault accountable for the harms inflicted on survivors[.]” The bill is meant to be responsive to courts interpreting AB 2777’s revival provisions as being applicable only to entities that cover up sexual assault, rather than the perpetrators whose abuse was covered up.

But the language of the bill in print appears to go significantly beyond the scope of AB 2777. By making the bill in print applicable to **any** lapsed claim alleging that—among other things—“(A) That the plaintiff was sexually assaulted,” the bill in print’s limitations in (B) and (C) are swallowed up by the all-inclusive (A), and therefore superfluous. Therefore, the bill in print appears to allow **any** claim for sexual assault that is time-barred as of January 1, 2025 to be revived and allowed to be filed for a two-year period between January 1, 2025 and December 31, 2026 (at least where a private entity is involved).

In order to address the apparently inadvertent overbreadth of the bill in print, the author proposes the following amendment to somewhat limit the effect of the bill:

(e) (1) Notwithstanding any other law, any claim seeking to recover damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault that occurred on or after the plaintiff’s 18th birthday that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2025, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if already pending in court on January 1, 2025, or, if not filed by that date, may be commenced between January 1, 2025, and December 31, 2026.

(2) This subdivision revives claims brought by a plaintiff who alleges ~~any~~ **that the plaintiff was sexually assaulted and one** of the following:

(A) ~~The plaintiff was sexually assaulted.~~

~~(B)~~ One or more entities or persons, including the perpetrator of the sexual assault, are legally responsible for damages arising out of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator against the plaintiff.

~~(C)~~ (B) An entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.

It should be noted that the newly re-lettered (A), as proposed by the author’s amendments—“One or more entities or persons, including the perpetrator of the sexual assault, are legally responsible for damages arising out of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator against the plaintiff”—seems to merely restate the basic pleading requirement for all civil claims: that an entity or person is responsible for damages arising from the conduct that injured the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the bill as proposed to be amended is slightly more narrow than the bill in print. Also, the newly re-lettered (B) proposed by the amendments—“An entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse”—is focused on the same issue that was addressed by AB 2777 (a cover-up perpetrated by an entity or entities of a sexual assault). But in this legislative do-over, survivors of sexual assault will also clearly have the ability to bring claims against the perpetrators of sexual assault once their causes of action are revived by this bill.

Additional amendments requested by the opposition. The coalition of business groups that are opposed to the bill write in their joint letter, “AB 2587 could be amended to affect the goal of the author while limiting the bill’s most problematic application.”

In meeting with the author’s office, we were told the main goal of AB 2587 was to revive claims against perpetrators who were omitted from the 2022 adult reviver bill. CJAC offered amendments to AB 2587 that would have limited the two-year reviver window to claims against a perpetrator (the person who committed the sexual assault) and to claims alleging that a person or entity aided and abetted in the commission of a sexual assault, as defined by Section 31 in the California penal code. We believe these amendments would address the concern that claims against perpetrators were omitted from AB 2777 and appropriately define fault for those who aided and abetted such conduct. Those amendments have not been accepted.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Sponsor Victim Policy Institute writes the following in support of the bill:

The person who committed the sexual assault or the entity whose intentional or negligent act caused the sexual assault were not intended to be excluded from AB 2777 (Wicks) as the issue of cover up was being addressed in the state.

Currently, accused perpetrators of sexual assault are interpreting AB 2777 to mean the statute did not intend to allow victims of sexual assault to revive claims against individuals who committed the sexual assault. They are also asserting AB 2777 only applies to workplace assaults at major companies. A recent state Court of Appeal’s analysis included that the revival of claims under Code of Civil Procedure 340.16(e) depends upon whether plaintiffs have alleged a cover up.

AB 2587 would clarify any confusion for victims of sexual assault by making clear that cover up is not required in order for them to come forward against their perpetrators or the entities whose intentional or negligent act caused the sexual assault. The bill would also allow more time for victims.

Consumer Attorneys of California write the following:

AB 2587 will clarify that the legislature intends to hold both the perpetrators of sexual assault, and entities who covered up or willfully ignored the assault, accountable for the harm inflicted on survivors. This bill allows a limited time for survivors to seek recourse by clarifying the intent of past legislation.

ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The coalition of business groups that are opposed to the bill write the following in their joint letter:

AB 2587 attempts to recast the negotiated provisions in AB 2777 (Wicks) (Chapter 422, 2022) (reviving claims against entities that allegedly “covered up” evidence related to a sexual assault) which at the time was the broadest reviver bill to be presented to a California governor in the state’s history. This bill goes further by reviving any claims alleging injuries not only from sexual assault, but also related employment claims. The justification for AB 2777 was that an entity should not be able to avoid being held accountable for wrongdoing by engaging in a cover up to run out the statutes of limitations clock, but AB 2587 expands

the window by two additional years, without a justification for why this policy change is necessary at this time.

Not only does AB 2587 violate fundamental fairness principles in our civil justice system by disregarding the public policy benefits of the statutes of limitations, but it also discriminates against an entire class of sexual assault survivors who were victimized at the hands of public employers since this bill only applies to the private sector.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

Victim Policy Institute (sponsor)
Consumer Attorneys of California
Pave
Stand With Survivors
The Female Composer Safety League
The Punk Rock Therapist
Zero Abuse Project

Opposition

American Property Casualty Insurance Association
American Tort Reform Association
California Business Properties Association
California Business Roundtable
California Chamber of Commerce
California Retailers Association
Civil Justice Association of California
National Federation of Independent Business

Analysis Prepared by: Alison Merrilees / JUD. / (916) 319-2334